“…The
asserted defense of the Act has been expressly rejected in cases interpreting the Pension
Protection Clause.
“A long line of Illinois
authority defeats the defendants' argument that the Pension Protection Clause
contains an implied exception for the exercise of the State's police powers.
The principal question presented in this appeal was first resolved by the appellate
court in Kraus v. Bd. of Trustees of
Police Pension Fund of Village of Niles, 72 Ill. App. 3d 833, 850-51
(1979).
“In that case, the appellate
court recognized that a ‘Pension Code modification changing the basis upon
which pension benefits are directly determined cannot be applied to diminish
the benefits of those who became members of the system prior to the statute's
effective date.’ Id. at 850. The
appellate court noted that the defendant and the Attorney General ‘nevertheless
assert that the legislature should retain a reasonable power of modification,
even to diminish the benefits to be received by prior members of the pension
system.’ Id. at 851.
“The appellate court rejected that
argument and observed that ‘the Pension Laws Commission attempted to have
language allowing a reasonable power of legislative modification added to the
section or read into the debates to establish intent, but no such action was
taken during the convention.’ Id. (citation
omitted). ‘While it might have been wise to provide for such a power,’ the
court concluded, ‘there is no suggestion in the wording of the provision or in
the debates to support the existence of one.’ Id. (internal citation omitted).
“This Court rejected precisely
the same argument in Felt v. Bd. of
Trustees of Judges Ret. Sys., 107 III. 2d 158 (1985), when it held
unconstitutional an amendment to the Pension Code that modified the formula for
calculating the pensionable salaries of Judges Retirement System members so as
to reduce their pension annuities.
“Before it analyzed the
plaintiffs' separate claim that the amendment violated the Contract Clause of
the federal and state constitutions, this Court squarely held that the
statutory ‘change in the basis of computation’ of judges' pensionable salaries ‘clearly
effects a reduction or impairment in the retirement benefits of the plaintiff
members of State retirement systems in violation of the constitutional assurance
of section 5 of article XIII.’ Id. at
162-63.
“Near the end of its opinion,
this Court rejected the defendants' argument that Illinois should fall in line
with other ‘jurisdictions which permit a reduction in retirement benefits.’ Id. at 167-68. This Court explained: ‘[The defendants] note that in at least three
States, Alaska, Hawaii and Michigan, there are constitutional provisions
relating to pensions. As was observed in Kraus
v. Board of Trustees (1979), however, in those constitutional provisions,
unlike ours and that of New York, there is restrictive language that has
permitted modifications in benefits. In order to accept the defendants'
argument we would have to ignore the plain language of the Constitution of
Illinois’ Id. at 167-68 (internal citation omitted).
“Amazingly, the defendants argue
that Felt held the opposite of what
it actually said. They argue that while Felt
held a pension diminishment unconstitutional and denied that the General
Assembly had any power to reduce pension benefits for current State retirement
system members, it implicitly acknowledged a legislative power to diminish
pensions. (Def. Br. at 35-37.)
“To support this argument, the
defendants take a snippet of Felt dramatically
out of context. Alter holding that
the pension diminishment was an unconstitutional violation of the Pension
Protection Clause, the Court addressed the plaintiffs' separate argument that
the pension diminishment additionally violated the Contract Clause of the
federal and state constitutions. See 107 III. 2d at 165-66.
“With respect to that Contract
Clause claim, the defendants argued that the pension diminishments were ‘within
the State's police power.’ Id. at
165. The Court made the offhand observation that ‘[p]resumably the defendants
would offer a similar contention regarding’ the Pension Protection Clause, and
then promptly rejected the defendants' argument as ‘not convincing.’ Id. at 166.
“The Court proceeded to explain
why the defendants' argument failed even on its own terms (see Id. at 166-67), but the Court never said
that there was a police-powers exception to the Pension Protection Clause. In
fact, the Court held that it ‘would have to ignore the plain language of the
Constitution of Illinois’ to recognize a legislative power to reduce pension
benefits. Id. at 167-68. In short,
the defendants' interpretation of Felt cannot
withstand any careful reading of that opinion.
“In the three decades since Felt, this
Court and the appellate court have consistently held pension reductions
unconstitutional where they affect currently employed or retired members of
State retirement systems. In 1987, this Court held unconstitutional a statutory
amendment that merely created a new deadline by which a pre-existing pension
benefit had to be claimed, explaining that ‘the legislature cannot divest the
plaintiff of these rights.’ Buddell v.
Bd. of Trustees, State Univ. Ret. Sys. of 118 III. 2d 99, 106 (1987).
“In doing so, this Court made no
mention of any police power to diminish pension benefits, nor did it subject
the diminishment to any sort of balancing test. Summarizing the state of the
law almost a decade later, this Court observed that it ‘has consistently
invalidated amendments to the Pension Code where the result is to diminish
benefits.’ McNamee, 173 Ill. 2d at
445 (citing Felt and Buddell).
“Indeed,
since the 1970 Constitution came into effect, no Illinois court has held any
amendment to the Pension Code constitutional under the theory asserted by the
defendants. Likewise, in this Court's most recent interpretation of the Pension
Protection Clause, it recognized that ‘[w]e may not rewrite the pension
protection clause to include restrictions and limitations that the drafters did
not express and the citizens of Illinois did not approve.’ Kanerva, 2014 IL 115811, 1141. That holding necessarily defeats the
sole defense in this case. As this Court correctly recognized in Kanerva, pension benefits are ‘insulated
from diminishment or impairment by the General
Assembly.’ See id., ¶ 48; see also id., ¶ 57 (General Assembly was ‘precluded’
from diminishing or impairing benefits to which the Pension Protection Clause
applied)…”
from
Brief of ISEA RSEA Heaton and Harrison Plaintiffs-Appellees
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