“...The
defendants criticize the circuit court for creating a new and ‘unworkable’ rule
of law. (Def. Br. at 16.) That criticism is unfounded. The circuit court
created no new rule of law. It merely applied the Pension Protection Clause
according to its plain terms and according to the interpretation that Illinois
courts have consistently given those plain terms over multiple decades.
“When the
defendants say that this rule of law is ‘unworkable,’ what they presumably mean
is that the State has fiscal problems, and that the political branches of the
State government would prefer to address those problems by diminishing pension
benefits.
“In a
remarkable flight of fancy, the defendants describe a hypothetical ‘epidemic’
in which the State's pension obligations make it impossible to purchase and
distribute a vaccine. (Def. Br. at 20.) They also describe a hypothetical
scenario in which the State's pension obligations force it to ‘close its
prisons and schools.’ Id. The
defendants openly admit that ‘those precise circumstances may not be presented
here.’ Id. But they argue that those
non-existent facts should drive this Court's interpretation of the Pension
Protection Clause. Id.
“If adopted,
the defendants' proposed crisis-based legal standard would seriously distort
constitutional law. Just as one can imagine a nightmare scenario in which the State's pension
obligations render it incapable of saving the people from an epidemic, one can
imagine all sorts of equally far-fetched hypotheticals in which virtually any
constitutional restraint on legislative or executive power could have
catastrophic consequences.
“For
example, the Constitution provides that the State may tax incomes only ‘at a
non-graduated rate.’ See Ill. Constitution, Art. IX, § 3(a). But what if the
State needed to impose an income tax at a graduated rate in order to raise
money to save the people from an epidemic? Does positing that hypothetical mean
that the State now may tax incomes at a graduated rate as long as the tax is
deemed reasonable and necessary to serve an important State interest?
“Likewise,
the Constitution limits a governor's term to four years. See Ill. Constitution,
Art. V, §§ 1, 2. But what if a governor needed to extend his term to five years
in order to save the people from epidemics or terrorist attacks? Even if one
could plausibly imagine such a scenario, that does not mean that every
governor's term is now subject to an open-ended balancing test. Our
constitutional law is grounded in the text of the Constitution (see, e.g., People v. Purcell, 201 III. 2d
542, 549 (2002)), not in doomsday scenarios…”
from Brief of ISEA RSEA Heaton and Harrison
Plaintiffs-Appellees
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