It’s an obvious point, but credit cards in America
generate a lot of cash for banks. In 2022, I wrote up how the
business works, with the observation that the industry generates close to a
quarter trillion dollars a year in revenue. This revenue comes from fees for
connecting merchants and banks, as well as fees charged to consumers for access
to credit.
Every credit card network is also a data sieve, connected to
advertising data brokers, anti-fraud features, and analytics firms. In
addition, being able to reject someone from the payments system is a core
sovereign power, and the stated reason the right is so afraid of a central bank
digital currency.
There are many barriers to entry in the credit card business, and
significant pricing power among incumbents. As the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau found, margins for credit cards are persistent, increasing,
high, and tilted towards the larger firms in the
industry. (And this is true even when you take higher interest rates
into account.)
Capital One’s recently announced attempt to buy the
credit card company Discover hits at all of these elements of the business.
While the merger looks like a credit card bank buying another credit card bank
— and it’s certainly that — it is more like a Big Tech merger, where a bank is
trying to turn itself into a platform with an app store-like power over a class
of customers, in this case merchants. The key quote from Capital One co-founder
and CEO Richard Fairbank on the call announcing the deal was this: “The holy
grail is to be an issuer with our own network.”
Here’s what Fairbank meant. An issuer, aka a bank, is regulated
like a bank, while a credit card network is regulated like a network, which
includes price caps on debit cards. But thanks to the Fed, a bank that owns a
network isn’t regulated at all on its own network. And because of that, Capital
One, if allowed to buy Discover, can set prices in ways its rivals can’t.
Fairbank also made clear that’s a key rationale for the deal, as I’ll discuss
after I’ve explained the industry and the regulatory framework.
Let’s start with the basics of credit/debit cards. Banks make
money in two ways. They issue cards to consumers, and charge those consumers
credit card interest charges and various fees when they buy things with
merchants and don’t pay the money back immediately.
But banks also make money from the merchants themselves. In
between the bank and merchants sits a network utility, usually Visa or
Mastercard. The network operator takes a swipe fee, known as an ‘interchange
fee,’ from the merchant, roughly 1.5 to 3.5 percent of every transaction, and
then splits that fee with the banks. Banks send some of that money back to the
consumer in the form of rewards to keep consumers locked into using that
card.
There’s a difference between American Express and
Visa or Mastercard. The latter two don’t issue their own cards, banks issue
them. Conversely, banks don’t issue American Express cards, only American
Express does that. So American Express isn’t a standard credit card network. It
is technically a ‘three-party system,’ between consumers, merchants, and
American Express itself. This distinction matters for legal reasons. (Though
American Express’ status as a three-party network isn’t strictly accurate, U.S.
Bank does issue credit cards that operate on AMEX.)
So what is Discover? Well, it’s both a
normal network and a three-party system. Like Visa and Mastercard, Discover
allows banks to issue Discover cards. But like American Express, it also issues
its own credit cards.
So why does any of this matter? Well,
America’s credit card system is a massive extraction machine for middlemen, and
this merger is part of a knife-fight over who can get the biggest piece. Nowhere else in the world is
there a payments system in which 1.5 to 3.5 percent of trillions of dollars of
transactions goes to a set of middlemen, but that’s how credit cards work in
America, much to the chagrin of merchants, both small ones and the giants like
Walmart.
Network fees are excessive because
Visa, Mastercard, American Express, and Discover have market power over
merchants, who must accept the cards their customers would like to use, even if
the fee those merchants have to pay is excessive.
In 2010, Congress actually noticed
this was a problem, Senator Dick Durbin attached an amendment to the Dodd-Frank
Act which regulated these networks. Specifically, the Durbin Amendment did two
things. It had the Fed impose a price cap on swipe fees for debit cards, and it
allowed merchants to choose among debit networks for processing debit
payments.
While the Fed tilted the rules as far
as it could towards banks, the Durbin amendment has delivered somewhat
for merchants. (The Durbin Amendment only addressed debit cards, not credit
cards, and so it left out large chunks of the market. There’s now Senate
legislation, called the Credit Card Competition Act, which would allow merchants to
choose among multiple payment networks for credit cards.)
But the Fed also punched a hole in the
Durbin Amendment. When writing the rule, the Fed went along with lobbying from American Express, and in
its 2010 rules exempted three-party
networks from regulation, only applying it to Visa and Mastercard. And this
brings me back to Capital One, whose CEO made this point explicitly on the
investor call announcing its attempt to buy Discover. Here’s Fairbank:
The Durbin debit rules, intentionally
and by design only applied in networks like Visa and MasterCard who negotiate
with merchants on behalf of thousands of banks, including negotiating terms and
pricing. Discover like American Express deals directly with merchants without
an intermediary. They are both the issuer and the network, so there is nobody
in between. The Durbin debit rules were written to explicitly exclude networks
like Discover and American Express.
Fairbank also noted that their
intention is to move Capital One’s debit portfolio immediately into Discover,
though it will only move part of its credit business. As Digital
Transactions Magazine put it, “Fairbank called
out a pricing advantage of the planned move into debit.” After this merger,
Capital One will have millions of merchants at its mercy, merchants who will
have the choice to either lose customers who want to use Discover, or accept
higher fees and more intrusive rules from Capital One.
Of course, there are other reasons for
the deal. Capital One will gain a funding advantage as a bank and become Too
Big to Fail if it acquires Discover. Additionally, Discover is a large issuer
of credit cards, and the bigger the credit card issuer, the higher the prices banks
tend to charge. If Capital One buys Discover, it’ll jump to the number-one
largest credit card issuer. But the pricing power it will acquire as the owner
of Discover is a core stated reason for the merger.
And to underscore the point about
barriers to entry, Fairbank also made that clear when he told investors about
his lust for Discover’s network, saying that “we all kind of revel in the fact
that a network is a very, very rare asset. There are very few of them. And it’s
just, you know, I don’t think people are going to be building any of these
anytime soon.”
That’s not stating outright that the
goal is monopolization, but it’s pretty close.
So will the merger go through? The
deal has already drawn high-profile opposition from both sides of the aisle, as
the American Prospect reports:
Several advocacy groups have come out
against the merger proposal, including the National Community Reinvestment
Coalition, which has fought Capital One in particular for
several years. Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) said on Wednesday that the deal
should be blocked, joining Sen. Elizabeth Warren, who opposed the merger a day earlier.
Under the current administration, it’s
hard to see a clear path for approval. The Federal Reserve and Office of
Comptroller of the Currency would have to allow the deal, and then the
Antitrust Division would have to give a green light. The Fed and the OCC are
weak, but they are also embarrassed.
And given the CEO stated on the
acquisition call that the ability to raise prices and reduce competition
through a regulatory loophole is one of the key reasons for the deal, the
Antitrust Division strikes me as an unlikely ally of the deal. As Steptoe lawyer
Stephen Aschettino put it, “I think antitrust is probably first and foremost on
the list of hurdles that Capital One is going to have to get past, and that
could take a while.”
That said, in many ways this deal is
contingent upon the election. If there’s a change in administration, then there
will be a different set of bank regulators and antitrust enforcers. It’s not
clear what happens then. In his first term, Donald Trump was lax about banking
consolidation, though his Antitrust Division did sue to stop the Visa
merger with Plaid.
So one could see this deal as a bet on
Biden losing. But I think that’s overthinking it a bit, since there’s no reason
Capital One couldn’t just wait until after the election to announce the deal.
Capital One CEO Fairbank is known as a super aggressive operator; he has
already been fined for
violating antitrust laws multiple times.
If I had to guess, I’d say this one’s
about ego, as many of these mergers are. Fairbank is a billionaire, and so he
won’t be dislodged from his position as CEO regardless of whether he has to
walk away from the deal. He’s probably thinking, swing for the fences, the
worst that happens is you strike out.
But what this deal really shows is
that the U.S. payments system is ripe for genuine reform, whether that’s
through the Fed making its public payments system, called FedNow, workable, or
Congress enacting more rules mandating competition in payments. Regardless, you
shouldn’t become a billionaire by grifting on payment fees that no other
country in the world tolerates. And a merger to enable further bloat and
consolidation isn’t the way out.
-Matt Stoller
Editor’s note: This story was originally printed on Matt Stoller’s newsletter BIG, where
he explores the politics of monopoly power.
The Lever is a nonpartisan, reader-supported investigative news outlet that
holds accountable the people and corporations manipulating the levers of power.
The organization was founded in 2020 by David Sirota, an award-winning
journalist and Oscar-nominated writer who served as the presidential campaign
speechwriter for Bernie Sanders.
Source URL: https://portside.org/2024-03-02/fed-behind-credit-card-merger
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