“…The
Federal Constitution Does Not Prohibit a State From Limiting Its Own Powers
Through Its Constitution.
“The issue
before this Court is the extent to which the Pension Protection Clause of the
Illinois Constitution limits the power of the General Assembly. There is no
federal question. Nevertheless, the defendants argue that the ‘reserved powers
doctrine’ of the Contract Clause in the federal Constitution prohibits a state from limiting its own
powers under its own law. (Def. Br. at 40-45.) The defendants' theory is
unprecedented and contrary to basic principles of federalism.
“The
reserved powers doctrine merely holds that the federal Contract Clause will not
lock a state into a contract that surrenders one of several specific sovereign
powers. U.S. Trust Co. of New York v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. I, 23 (1977). The doctrine does not require states to
maintain the maximum sovereign powers permitted by the federal Constitution.
None of the cases cited by the defendants supports that proposition. In fact,
the United States Supreme Court has explicitly invited states to limit their sovereign
powers if they so choose. Compare Kelo v.
City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 489 (2005) (‘We emphasize that
nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing further restrictions on
its exercise of the takings power.
“Indeed, many States already impose 'public
use' requirements that are stricter than the federal baseline. Some of these
requirements have been established as a matter of state constitutional law,
while others are expressed in state eminent domain statutes’) (footnote omitted)
with U.S. Trust Co. of New York, 431
U.S. at 23-24 (recognizing the power of eminent domain as an essential
sovereign power).
“The Illinois Appellate Court has likewise
recognized that ‘the State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater
restrictions on the police power than those held to be necessary upon federal
constitutional standards.’ Parkway Bank
& Trust Co. v. City of Darien, 43 III. App. 3d 400, 406 (1976).
“The defendants' reserved powers argument
confuses contracts and statutes with constitutions. The reserved powers
doctrine addresses the surrender of sovereign powers by contract or statute.
See, e.g., U.S. Trust Co. of New York, 431
U.S. at 23-24. This Court, however, is being asked to interpret a
constitutional provision. There is no reserved power exception to the specific
limits which a state's constitution places on that state's legislature. See, e.g., O'Brien, 219 III. 2d at 100
(‘the General Assembly cannot enact
legislation that conflicts with specific provisions of the constitution’); Flushing Natl. Bank v. Municipal Assistance
Corp. for City of N.Y., 40 N.Y.2d 731, 740 (N.Y. 1976) (‘the police power
which may override statutes is not a higher law which transcends Constitutions
as well’).
“The irrelevance of the reserved power
doctrine to the interpretation of the Pension Protection Clause is well
illustrated by Flushing National Bank, a
case arising from the State of New York's efforts in the 1970s to reduce New
York City's crushing municipal debt.
“At issue in Flushing National Bank was a law preventing certain short-term
municipal noteholders from enforcing their notes in court for a period of three
years. Id. at 733. The New York State
Constitution contained a clause requiring the City to pledge its ‘faith and
credit’ to all debt obligations. The court interpreted the faith and credit
clause as an unambiguous commitment, without exception, to pay the notes as they
came due—a ‘super contract,’ as the defendants would describe it. Id. at 734-36.
“The New York Court of Appeals held that
regardless of the city's .fiscal distress and the legislature's
claimed ‘police powers,’ the faith and credit clause flatly prohibited the
moratorium law. Id. The court further
held that the legislature's violation of this constitutional provision could ‘not
be justified by fugitive recourse to the police power of the State or to any
other constitutional power to displace inconvenient but intentionally protective constitutional limitations.’ Id. at 736.
“Of particular relevance to the defendants'
reserved powers argument, the court explicitly declined to apply federal
Contract Clause jurisprudence because ‘Wederal constitutional provisions,
especially the impairment clause, cast little light on the State constitutional
issues in this case.’ Id. at 740.
In other words, the state's constitution, not a contract, limited the
legislature's power, so the question of reserved powers was beside the point.
“Here, just as in Flushing National Bank, a constitution, not a contract or a
statute, prohibits the legislature from avoiding a financial obligation. Just
as in Flushing National Bank, the
defendants invoke police powers and a purported fiscal emergency as
justification for doing precisely what the State Constitution prohibits. Just
as in Flushing National Bank, the federal
Contract Clause and the reserved power doctrine are beside the point.
Regardless of whether a legislature can surrender its sovereign powers by
contract or statute, no reserved sovereign power allows a state legislature to
sidestep the plain prohibitions set out in its own constitution…”
from Brief of ISEA RSEA Heaton and Harrison
Plaintiffs-Appellees
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