Hum If You Can’t Sing

So what if at every conflict in life we burst
into song – thoughtless as reciting a prayer –

reward our feet with a waltz or two,
congratulate ourselves with an aria

then tap dance our way through
the kitchen and dining room?

And suppose the musicians arrive early
each morning to tune up their strings

and oil their drums
while the white-gloved conductor waits

with his cue sheet at the breakfast table?
Would we expect a chorus prophesying disaster

or a fugue in D-minor? Why not ask 

for a drum roll through toiletry instead

or a diminuendo through dinner?
And what might our friends and spouse say

about all that sheet music stuffed in our pockets,
about our lives cluttered with voice lessons,

rehearsals and women dressed in high heels
and fishnet stockings?

Imagine the fun of it all, the spotlight
on us all as we dance and sing

throughout our lives with our pets joining in
with happy tails, and birds whistling

from their cages, encouraging applause
for our pitch-perfect singing each day.


“Hum If You Can't Sing” was originally published in Prairie Light Review, 1992.
 

In the Crosshairs

For five days the buck hung
from the wrought-iron grate,

a large, brown buck, heavy with muscle.
Its eyes held the look of an animal

about to be shot.
Raymond Benedetti, a pharmacist,

with a half-dozen hunting dogs
smelling of musk-rank fur,

worked his knife into its belly,
unknotting entrails before my eyes.

It wasn’t until the fifth day
that someone complained

about the stench and sound
of the chainsaw grinding through bone,

about the head that lay
on the front stoop one evening,

its deciduous antlers hacked from the skull.
I watched as a young boy would, an accomplice,

under a pale gray Midwestern sky
deep in November.

The neighbor’s cats kept their distance,
the air charged with pity and thanksgiving.


“In the Crosshairs” was originally published in Willow Review, 1993.

“In the Crosshairs” received an award from Poets & Patrons of Illinois in 1993.

 

Tax Reform! Not Pension Reform, Budget Cuts and Tax Breaks for the Wealthy

An article in the State Journal Register (November 17, 2011) states that the five public pension systems need $5.33 billion for fiscal year 2013, approximately one billion dollars more than was originally anticipated, though Governor Quinn also says that state revenue is expected to grow by $1.3 billion next year.

This amount has increased 20% overall because of increases of approximately $700 to $800 million for Medicaid; changes in assumptions by actuaries from the State University Retirement System; the passing of SB 1946 (Public Act 96-0889) in April of 2010 that caps new public employees’ salaries and lowers their benefits; (note: there will be less money available for contributions to the pension systems); and, most importantly, because larger payments are needed today as a result of the faulty 1995 “ramp-up” funding law (Public Act 88-593) to pay the pension systems what the state owes because of its lack of payments to the pension systems for decades and its lofty goal of a 90-percent funding ratio by 2045 (Wetterich) -- even though only 15 states in the nation have a funded ratio slightly over 70 percent while the average funding ratio is 63 percent (Barclays Capital, May 2011). (According to the National Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems (May 2011), “a funded ratio of 70 percent or above is [considered more than] adequate”).

It is true pension reform will not address the current unfunded liability and that what the state's legislators should focus upon is structural reforms for revenue and pension debt, but they have no political will to do it. Solving the shortfall between available assets and accrued liabilities is not the issue. It’s a symptom of a greater cause. Pension systems carry liabilities into perpetuity because they are “perpetual government agencies” (The Teachers’ Retirement System of Illinois). There is never a need to match assets and liabilities ever.

It is also true that most state legislators lack the political backbone to address the causes of the budget problems but prefer scapegoating public employees and their pension systems instead. They are abetted by the Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of Chicago, the Civic Federation and the Chicago Tribune, to name just a few. Illinois legislators do not want to pay what is owed to the public pension systems even though past legislators, especially past governors, were the cause of the public pension systems’ lack of funding throughout the decades.

What is needed to solve the budget problems in Illinois is a better revenue base to pay the state’s self-induced debts. What is easier to do is to evade serious problem solving of the budget issue and to incriminate the state’s public employees.

The issue at hand is the state’s regressive tax rate that no one wants to confront. The public lacks awareness and understanding about the main causes of the state’s budget deficits. Legislators, the Civic Committee, et al. have capitalized on the public's ignorance of the essential causes of the state's financial debacle by calling for budget cuts and radical pension reform as the solutions. They are diversionary, scapegoating tactics that will bring intentional, financial harm to public employees and allow legislators to escape legal and ethical responsibility.

“At the core of the budget ‘crisis’ facing [Illinois] is [its] regressive state tax structure… that is, low-and-middle-income families pay a greater share of their income in taxes than the wealthy… [A regressive tax] disproportionately impacts low-income people because, unlike the wealthy, [low-income people] are forced to spend a majority of their income purchasing basic needs that are subject to sales taxes” (United for a Fair Economy).

Instead of reforming the state's tax system, legislators (and their wealthy subsidizers) have focused on radical pension reform and severe budget cuts to services that the rest of us need. What do the wealthy and their puppet legislators propose? They propose sweeping, radical pension reform that will destroy the public employees’ defined-benefit pension plans, even though they know current unfunded liabilities will not be resolved by pension reform.

In addition, Illinois legislators propose budget cuts that will undermine healthcare for children, the elderly and low-income families; budget cuts that will prolong and increase the state’s unemployment; budget cuts in public safety and transportation; budget cuts in education; and budget cuts that will stifle economic recovery.

It is true that if the State of Illinois “does not [create] a contemporary tax system, one that is both sound and responsive to the needs of state, basic and necessary programs face the chopping block” (Center for Tax and Budget Accountability, CTBA).

Consider, for example, budget cuts in K through 12 and higher education: “Disparities in [the state’s] school funding and, therefore, quality of education, would be significantly reduced if the primary basis for school funding was on state revenues,” and that is why Illinois is “next to last in a ranking of states based on funds spent on education” (CTBA). As it is now, property taxes used as the main sources of revenue for school funding guarantee income inequalities among school districts throughout the State of Illinois.

Let’s be concerned about why the State of Illinois cannot obtain more revenue. Besides federal sources of income, the state uses only 11 sources of revenue: personal income tax (but note that Illinois was tied for the fourth lowest individual tax rate on households in the top income bracket), corporate income tax (note the recent extortionate tax breaks given to some Illinois corporations), sales tax (note that Illinois does not tax services like most other states for another significant source of revenue), corporate franchise tax and fees, public utility taxes, vehicle use tax, inheritance tax, insurance taxes and fees, cigarette taxes, liquor taxes and other miscellaneous (or rather unsubstantial) tax sources (Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability, June 2011).

In regards to sales taxes, “a majority of states apply their sales tax to less than one-third of 168 potentially-taxable services… [States that do not tax services, such as Illinois], probably could increase [its] sales tax revenue by more than one-third if [it] taxed services purchased by households comprehensively” (the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, July 2009).

Consider that a broader-based taxation system would provide a decrease in taxes for low-income and many middle-income families. Taxing services alone “would generate enough revenue to stabilize the General Revenue Fund and prevent structural deficits that lead to cuts in basic needs and social service programs” (CTBA). As long as our legislators play their political ping pong game with one another, it is impossible to obtain any just resolutions to the state’s perpetuated budget problems.

A case in point: reflect upon this potential financial windfall for corporations considered by legislators who are also ironically contemplating budget cuts and pension reform for the rest of us: "A package of tax breaks aimed at helping business and keeping a few high-profile companies from leaving Illinois could cost the government $850 million a year in its current form, raising the possibility that it will have to be scaled back to win approval from the Legislature. The package started as a move to lower the tax bill for two Chicago-based financial exchanges, CME Group Inc. and CBOE Holdings Inc., which are threatening to leave Illinois. Add a tax break for Sears to the mix, followed by tax incentives for businesses in general, and then measures to help poor families.

"Each new tax break means less money to run state government, requiring officials to get more money elsewhere or cut services… State government would have to absorb most of that loss, but 6 percent — or about $50 million — would hit the budgets of local governments across Illinois" (Associated Press, November 18, 2011).  

So why can’t the State of Illinois provide a fair and sound tax system (Illinois is one of seven states with a regressive flat-rate tax), one that is “efficient with minimal impact on the economic decisions that taxpayers have to make” (CTBA), one that captures increased revenues in times of economic growth, one that maintains revenue collections during poor economic times, one that is simple and not liable to inconspicuous error, one that is transparent and builds trust with the state’s government officials (CTBA), and one that helps 99 percent of the state’s population?

The answer is most legislators in the State of Illinois prefer the easy way out of a difficult and challenging situation. Illinois legislators will not address the most important causes of the state's budget deficits: the state's flat-rate taxation and pension debt because of their own self-interests and the wealthy one percent that bankrolls them.

-Glen Brown

Pension Hybrid Plans, Constitutional Challenges, and the Ethical Path to Take

Recently, a colleague sent me a brief about the State of Rhode Island’s pension reform. That state’s current reform proposal features a hybrid plan that combines a defined-benefit and defined-contribution savings plan. Imagine an option that would divide a teacher’s contribution as follows: from a 9.4 percent contribution, perhaps 5 percent would be contributed to a defined-benefit plan and 4.4 percent would be contributed to a defined-contribution savings plan, where both the employer and the employee would share the market risk with the supposition that the earnings from the defined-contribution plan would still reap the financial recompenses of group investing.

In other words, “a defined-contribution savings plan could be stacked on top to provide additional retirement income for those at the higher end of the pay scale. Such an approach would ensure a more equitable sharing of risks and would also prevent headlines generated by the occasional inflated public pension benefit” (Center for Retirement Research, April 2011).

We might ask, however, whether there are legal repercussions for such pension reforms. In Rhode Island, for instance, “pension reform is more than just an educational, financial and political issue. It’s also a legal issue” (Education Sector Policy Briefs, November 2011). In Illinois, it's also a constitutional issue.

It’s an educational issue because an essential goal for any state when considering pension reform is to attract and retain the finest possible teacher candidates available. It’s a financial issue because pension reform should be fair, affordable and address the issue of continued sustainability of the pension system. This has been duly noted elsewhere that “saving the pension system entirely on the backs of new teachers will not only fail to solve a state’s financial problems, more importantly, it will rob its future by making it more difficult to recruit new teachers” (Education Sector Policy Briefs…). This factor has apparently been forgotten by Illinois legislators, along with the fact that the State of Illinois will also have a serious Social Security issue to address in the not so distant future if a hybrid plan is passed for new teachers.

Furthermore, it’s a political issue because it entails the distinction among assumptions, values, beliefs and facts; the necessity for conflict resolution; and the application of powerful decision-making that will affect hundreds of thousands of people’s lives. Finally, it’s a legal issue because pension reform should concur with constitutional law and, therefore, be safeguarded.

Indeed, we are also aware that a challenge to a state’s constitution might take the form of a state’s exercise of “power as a sovereign to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens” (Education Sector Policy Briefs…). In regards to the “diminishing or impairing” of a clause or contract that protects citizens’ rights, the United States Supreme Court has held “that the court must establish that impairment is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose, such as ‘the remedying of a broad and general social or economic problem.’ To show that a change is necessary, the state must establish that no less drastic modification could have been implemented to accomplish the state’s goal; and that the state could not have achieved its public policy goal without modification” (Education Sector Policy Briefs…).

This particular option has seldom been brought to the test, and for good reasons. To declare that a state is in an “emergency state,” will ignite legal questions and litigation about the competency and ethical motivations of the policy makers and whether they had truly exhausted every alternative available to them for resolving a state’s financial debts.

Moreover, according to Dave Urbanek, TRS Public Information Officer: “State law [in Illinois] empowers TRS (40 ILCS 5/16-158c)… Payment of the required State contributions and of all pensions, retirement annuities, death benefits…, all other benefits…, and all expenses are obligations of the State… The State has waved its sovereign immunity in regard to the teachers’ pension because TRS is a qualified pension plan under the tax-deferred provisions of the IRS code. Federal law would protect all claims..."

In a recent decision concerning the reduction or elimination of a statutory exemption for public-pension incomes, for example, one state’s Supreme Court’s conclusion was unequivocal: “the people can and should expect shared sacrifice; however, it cannot come at the expense of constitutional nullification, and the legislature cannot expect to balance the budget on the backs of state workers” (State of Michigan in the Supreme Court, August 2011).

If we want “everyone” to share the burden for our state’s financial problems besides the new and future public employees of Illinois who, as the result of SB 1946, are now paying down the state’s mounting service debt (which will have to be eventually addressed), a way for legislators to collect needed revenue ethically is to raise the taxes of the wealthy elite and bring to a halt the corporate blackmailing of state government and the awarding of lucrative tax breaks.

The Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (November 2009) maintains that the top 5 percent of income earners in Illinois pay the least amount of sales, excise, property, and income taxes because of federal deduction offsets or substantial tax savings from itemized deductions, such as capital gains tax breaks and deductions for federal income taxes paid that are coupled with an antiquated flat-rate tax structure.

Legislators should also consider spreading the tax base in Illinois: “A high-quality revenue system relies on a diverse and balanced range of sources… If reliance is divided among numerous sources and their tax bases are broad, rates can be made low in order to minimize the impact on behavior. A broad base itself helps meet the goal of diversification since it spreads the burden of the tax among more payers than a narrow basis does. And the low rates that broad bases make possible can improve a state’s competitive position relative to other states” (National Conference of State Legislatures, June 2007).

What is more, legislators should consider including the taxation of services instead of raising state income taxes. Consistent with creating a broader tax base, the Chicago Metropolitan Agency for Planning (July 2011) argues that the tax system in Illinois and most other states do not reflect today’s economic realities. States that do not tax services, such as Illinois, “probably could increase [its] sales tax revenue by more than one-third if [it] taxed services purchased by households comprehensively” (Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, July 2009).

Let us not forget the underlying reasons that have caused the pension systems’ unfunded liability in the first place. The unfunded liability of the pension systems in Illinois grew exponentially because of the state’s inconsistent funding methods for decades, the state’s unreliable accounting methods, and the special deals made by legislators and other stakeholders that were to be funded with future monies.

The scapegoating of public employees intensified when greed and corruption, particularly flagrant in the financial sector, exploded into the Great Recession. This, of course, came after eight years of inordinate military spending for two costly wars, deregulation and unprecedented tax cuts for the wealthy by the federal government. This tsunami of debt contributed to every state’s budget deficits.

A final question and answer for all of us to ponder: now who found it self-serving to confound the facts of the matter and shift the blame for the resultant economic debacle occurring in Illinois? The answer is those who benefit most by ignoring the injustices inherent in our state’s archaic system of income distribution, regressive tax loopholes for the wealthy, and flat-rate taxation. In other words, a three-headed Cerberus (better known as Tyrone Fahner of the Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of Chicago; his doppelganger, Laurence Msall’s of the Civic Federation; and their mouthpiece, the Chicago Tribune) has hoodwinked the citizenry of Illinois. This is made quite evident by Fahner’s Illinois Is Broke advertisements and their emphasis on so-called pension reform (Senate Bill 512) that will ensure the continuation of obscene profits that flow east along the River Styx of Chicago to the doors of 21 South Clark Street.

-Glen Brown

Munditia, Patron Saint of Lonely Women

(St. Peter’s Church, Munich)

She is believed to have been martyred in 310 A.D., beheaded 
with a hatchet. Once kept hidden in a wooden box,
she was put on display in 1883. Each year, a feast day is held
in her honor complete with a High Mass and candle procession
on November 17th.

for M.K.

She was propped up one day
in a black-and-silver sepulcher
with an eternal glass view,
her vest sewn with gaudy charms,
her gloved hands clutching a chalice
half-filled with sand
and a long golden feather.

How difficult to look at those eyes,
fixed in a perpetual stare mocking death,
at her stone-studded skeleton
encased in glass, and to think
about her estranged life,
a lifetime devoted to Christ, her ex-lover,
and how you said:
"Poor, pitiful woman cheated by faith
and her celibate single-mindedness."

And then to imagine that someone
could bejewel her, knowing all along
that her most precious gem,
her locus of power,
had rotted away to bone
where "even from the tomb
the voice of nature cries."


“Munditia, Patron Saint of Lonely Women” was originally published in Willow Review, 1992.

“Munditia, Patron Saint of Lonely Women” also received awards from Willow Review and Poet Magazine in 1992.

Sustainability, Affordability and Constitutionality: Are They Compatible?

How do we balance sustainability of the public pension system, affordability for the State of Illinois, and constitutionality (Bob Lyons, TRS Trustee)?

Illinois legislators realize that the cost of ramping up payments to address the unfunded liability is unaffordable based upon today’s depressing revenue projections. “In 1995, Illinois passed a pension-ramp bill requiring significant, annual increases in the state's contribution to its public employee retirement systems, to make up for a decades long practice of failing to make the full, employer contributions into the system. That is why the pension contribution escalates… each year. It is also why Illinois has a [total] unfunded liability in excess of $83 billion today [for all five public pensions]” (Center for Tax and Budget Accountability, CTBA).

What can any union leader or anyone else, for that matter, offer the state that will address the increasing service debt and decrease school district contributions and the required state contributions through 2045? According to Buck Consultants (June 2010), total school district contributions will not begin to decrease until 2043, and combined state and federal funds that are required will continue to increase until 2046.

How much do we need to pay of the service debt to keep the teachers’ retirement pension plan and the other four public pension plans solvent, even though the plans have always had an unfunded liability with fluctuating funding ratios that will never come due all at once? What proposals are there besides the Civic Committee’s flawed SB 512? Why would some legislators vote for a bill that has both obvious and unforeseen consequences for everyone “unless something better comes along?”

Why aren’t there any Nobel-prize winning economists of Illinois in this discussion? Where are the most prominent Illinois lawyers, and why aren't their opinions being solicited regarding legal ramifications? Why are we hearing only from the Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of Chicago that has much to gain from the passing of SB 512?

Should the IEA negotiate and "impair" the 1970 pension clause (Article XIII, Section 5)? Did SB 7 ruin any possibility for good-faith negotiations with state legislators (remember what Jonah Edelman revealed)? Is it because of the belief that once one side gives up something inviolable, the other side will insist for more concessions? How will any negotiation affect union members who pay their dues consistently to ensure that their hard-earned benefits are not decreased because public employees, such as teachers, only have one retirement pension and not Social Security to rely upon?

Can the IEA and other unions offer anything by way of negotiation on the issue that “something must be done” about the unfunded liability and the increasing state payments? What should teachers give up to solve the financial problems of this state that are the resultant causes of past-and-present greed, corruption and incompetence?

Moreover, is it fair that teachers and other public employees remain scapegoats for the problems that they did not cause? Indeed, few people care about the legal, moral and ethical appeals that are grounded in such an argument. However, why didn’t the state “consider implementing a new revenue source targeted to repaying pension liabilities that is independent of base revenue streams from income, sales, excise and utility taxes” (CTBA, 2006)? Why didn’t the state also consider a broader tax base and/or taxation of services instead of an increase in income taxes?

The passing of SB 1946 last April of 2010 (the current Tier-Two plan that began in January 2011) will most likely assure the demise of the Tier-One defined-benefit plan. Consider that the current proposed and amended SB 512 by freezing benefits in the Tier-One defined-benefit plan (for those who choose a Tier-Two option for its six percent contribution rate, capped final salary, reduced Cost of Living Adjustment (COLA) and full retirement benefits at the age of 67) will also hasten the demise of the Tier-One defined benefit plan. Consider the inevitability that members who choose the Tier-Three defined-contribution plan (401K) will also hasten the demise of the Tier-One benefit plan, and this will do nothing to eliminate the unfunded liability that the state is required to pay.

One thing seems certain: both current and retired teachers and their families have the most to lose by passing the amended SB 512. Consider that the Tier-One defined-benefit plan depends upon membership contributions for its sustainability, precarious contributions from the State of Illinois, and volatile Market investment returns.

According to the IEA president, Cinda Klickna, "We need to develop a plan that is constitutional, fair to the participants and will ensure the systems will, for many decades to come, continue to deliver the benefits earned by the participants and retirees. The pension systems must be sustainable." The teachers of Illinois are anxiously waiting for that plan.

So what might follow SB 512? Imagine an amendment to the state constitution that challenges Article XIII, Section 5, or a reduction or elimination of the retirees’ COLA and the taxation of their annuity, or the shifting of the state's pension costs to school districts...? What about state bankruptcy as an option? Just ask our U.S. Senator from Illinois, Mark Kirk, about this absurd possibility.

-Glen Brown

Amendment to SB512 [Other points of interest]

Amendment to SB512 (Nov. 7, 2011) [Other points of interest]:

Pages 6-7 [Tier-Two]:
(c) A member or participant is entitled to a retirement annuity upon written application if he or she has attained age 67 and has at least 10 years of service credit and is otherwise eligible under the requirements of the applicable Article. A member or participant who has attained age 62 and has at least 10 years of service credit and is otherwise eligible under the requirements of the applicable Article may elect to receive the lower retirement annuity provided in subsection (d) of this Section.

(d) The retirement annuity of a member or participant who is retiring after attaining age 62 with at least 10 years of service credit shall be reduced by one-half of 1% for each full month that the member's age is under age 67.

(e) Any retirement annuity or supplemental annuity shall be subject to annual increases on the January 1 occurring either on or after the attainment of age 67 or the first anniversary of the annuity start date, whichever is later. Each annual increase shall be calculated at 3% or one-half the annual unadjusted percentage increase (but not less than zero) in the consumer price index-u for the 12 months ending with the September preceding each November 1, whichever is less, of the originally granted retirement annuity. If the annual unadjusted percentage change in the consumer price index-u for the 12 months ending with the September preceding each November 1 is zero or there is a decrease, then the annuity shall not be increased.

Pages 84-85
(40 ILCS 5/9-170.6 new)
Sec. 9-170.6. Employer contributions to the self-managed plan: Beginning in fiscal year 2014, for members electing benefits under paragraph (3) of subsection (a) of Section 9-170.5, an employer contribution shall be made each fiscal year in an amount equal to 6% of total pensionable payroll for the respective employee group.

(40 ILCS 5/9-170.7 new)
Sec. 9-170.7. Maximum self-managed plan participation. By
January 1, 2013, the Fund shall certify its total active participant population. When the number of participants that elect the self-managed plan is equal to 20% of the total active participant population, then no participant may elect the self-managed plan.

Beginning in 2016 and every 3 years thereafter, the Fund shall recertify its total active participant population and the number of participants in the self-managed plan. If the number of participants in the self-managed plan is less than 20% of the recertified total active participant population, then eligible participants may elect to participate in the self-managed plan. However, participants shall be prohibited from electing to participate once the Fund determines that the number of participants in the self-managed plan is equal to 20% of the number of total active participants in the Fund.

Pages 249-50
(40 ILCS 5/16-133) (from Ch. 108 1/2, par. 16-133)
Sec. 16-133. Retirement annuity; amount:
(A)The amount of the retirement annuity shall be (i) in the case of a person who first became a teacher under this Article before July 1, 2005, the larger of the amounts determined under paragraphs (A) and (B) below, or (ii) in the case of a person who first becomes a teacher under this Article on or after July 1, 2005, the amount determined under the applicable provisions of paragraph (B):

(A) An amount consisting of the sum of the following:
(1) An amount that can be provided on an actuarially equivalent basis by the member's accumulated contributions at the time of retirement; and
(2) The sum of (i) the amount that can be provided on an actuarially equivalent basis by the member's accumulated contributions representing service prior to July 1, 1947, and (ii) the amount that can be provided on an actuarially equivalent basis by the amount obtained by multiplying 1.4 times the member's accumulated contributions covering service subsequent to June 30, 1947; and
(3) If there is prior service, 2 times the amount that would have been determined under subparagraph (2) of paragraph (A) above on account of contributions which would have been made during the period of prior service creditable to the member had the System been in operation and had the member made contributions at the contribution rate in effect prior to July 1, 1947.

Beginning on July 1, 2013, for purposes of calculating the sum provided under this paragraph (A), member contributions in excess of the member contribution rates that apply to this benefit and are in effect immediately prior to July 1, 2013 shall not be considered when determining the amount of the member's accumulated contributions under subparagraph (1) or the additional sum based on the member's accumulated contributions under subparagraph (2). This paragraph (A) does not apply to a person who first becomes a teacher under this Article on or after July 1, 2005.

Pages 275-77
For State fiscal years 2014 through 2045, the minimum contribution to the System to be made by the State for each fiscal year shall be an amount equal to the sum of (i) the contribution determined under Section 16-158.2, plus (ii) an amount determined by the System to be sufficient to bring the total assets of the System up to 90% of the total actuarial liabilities of the System by the end of State fiscal year 2045.

In making the determinations under item (ii) of this subsection (b-3), for State fiscal years 2017 through 2045, the required State contribution shall be calculated each year as a level percentage of revenue provided by the individual income tax, sales tax, and corporate income tax assuming a 2.3% average annual growth rate in these revenues based on the most recent fiscal year's actual revenues as reported by the Commission on Government Forecasting and Accountability over the years remaining to and including fiscal year 2045 and shall be determined under the projected unit credit actuarial cost method.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this Article, State fiscal years 2014 through 2016, the State contribution to the System under item (ii) of this subsection (b-3), as a percentage of State revenue from the individual income tax, sales tax, and corporate income tax shall be increased in equal annual increments so that by State fiscal year 2017, the State is contributing at the rate required under this Section.

For State fiscal years 2014 through 2045, the total State contribution required in each fiscal year under this subsection (b-3) must not be less than 100% of the prior fiscal year's actual or required contribution, whichever is greater. Notwithstanding any other provision of this Article, the total required State contribution for this System for State fiscal year 2013 shall be $2,765,140,669.

Page 314:
Section 99. Effective date. This Act takes effect July 1,
2012.”