The following quotations are from the report:
Madiar chronicles the “history of
public pension funding in Illinois to give proper context to the Illinois
Constitution's Pension Clause, the General Assembly's recent legislation, and
the pending legal challenges to that legislation...”
Madiar also recounts the “aggressive
lobbying efforts by Illinois’ business community, principally the Commercial
Club of Chicago (the ‘Club’) to cut the benefits of current and retired
employees…; public employees and retirees’… different perspective and view [of]
Public Act 98-0599 [Senate Bill 1]…; Illinois’ long history of underfunding
public pensions…; [that] chronic underfunding continued after the Pension
Clause’s adoption in 1970…; [that] pension underfunding was further aggravated
during Governor Thompson’s tenure…; the 1995 Funding Plan by design increased
unfunded pension liabilities…; [and] the lack of proper pension funding stemmed
from a flawed fiscal system…
“[T]he Plaintiff’s claim that
Public Act 98-0599 violates three provisions of the Illinois Constitution: the
Pension Clause, the Contract Clause, and the Takings Clause… The Pension Clause
claim is the main argument against Public Act 98-0599 with the Contract and
Takings Clause claims pled as alternative legal theories as to why the
legislation’s benefit changes improperly interfere with plaintiffs’ contract or
property rights…
“[T]he ‘We Are One’ and SUAA
plaintiffs also assert a Taking Clause claim that the State’s failure to
properly fund the State’s pension systems has resulted in a taking of private
property… [T]wo State employee groups assert that the legislation violates the
Illinois Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause by not applying the benefit
reductions to current and retired judges…
“[T]he notion that the Pension
Clause is subject to a police powers exception has already been rejected by
Illinois courts on two occasions… [T]he State’s police power is not superior to
the Pension Clause; rather it yields to the Clause, just as it yields to other
specific constitutional prohibitions and positive mandates.
“Also, the Pension Clause cannot
be equated with the Bill of Rights to the U.S. Constitution as inherently
containing or being subject to exceptions based on notions of necessity… The
Pension Clause, in contrast, does not have such a history or intent to
accommodate exceptions based on claims of necessity…
“[T]he likelihood of a police
power defense succeeding to vindicate Public Act 98-0599 should be at best an
extremely remote outcome, especially because of the Clause’s plain language,
drafting history, and purpose, and because of Illinois’ long-standing and
conscious failure to fund the pension systems…
“‘Let it not be said, however
great disasters may befall us, however much we may be impoverished, how heavy
the burden imposed upon us may be, we will, for relief, destroy the
constitution, or disregard its requirements. Our safety, in the midst of
perils, is in a strict observance of the constitution—this is the bulwark to
shield us from aggressions. Trifling with it, treating it lightly, dispensing with
this or that provision of it, is the sure precursor of the direst calamity
which can befall the people, the end of which cannot fail to be, anarchy and
ruin’ (1861 Illinois Laws at 208)…’”
To read the complete 43-page report, Click Here.
To read the complete 43-page report, Click Here.
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