US and Iranian negotiators met in Geneva earlier this week in what mediators described as the most serious and constructive talks in years. Oman’s foreign minister, Badr Albusaidi, spoke publicly of “unprecedented openness,” signaling that both sides were exploring creative formulations rather than repeating entrenched positions.
Discussions showed flexibility on nuclear limits and sanctions
relief, and mediators indicated that a principles agreement could have been
reached within days, with detailed verification mechanisms to follow within
months.
These were not hollow gestures. Real diplomatic capital was being spent. Iranian officials floated proposals designed to meet US political realities – including potential access to energy sectors and economic cooperation.
These were gestures calibrated to allow Donald Trump to present
any deal as tougher and more advantageous than the 2015 agreement he withdrew
the US from in May 2018. Tehran appeared to understand the optics Washington
required, even if contentious issues such as ballistic missiles and regional
proxy networks remained outside the immediate framework. Then, in the middle of
these talks, the bridge was shattered.
Sensing how close the negotiations were — and how
imminent military escalation had become — Oman’s foreign minister, Badr
Albusaidi, made
an emergency dash to Washington in a last-ditch effort to preserve the
diplomatic track.
In an unusually public move for a mediator, he appeared on CBS to outline just how far the talks had progressed. He described a deal that would eliminate Iranian stockpiles of highly enriched uranium, down-blend existing material inside Iran, and allow full verification by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) — with the possibility of US inspectors participating alongside them.
Iran, he suggested, would enrich only for
civilian purposes. A principles agreement, he indicated, could be signed within
days. It was a remarkable disclosure — effectively revealing the contours of a
near-breakthrough in an attempt to prevent imminent war.
But rather than allowing diplomacy to conclude, the US
and Israel have launched
coordinated strikes across Iran. Explosions were reported in Tehran and
other cities. Trump
announced “major combat operations,”, framing them as necessary to
eliminate nuclear and missile threats while urging Iranians to seize the moment
and overthrow their leadership. Iran responded with missile and drone attacks
targeting US bases and allied states across the region.
What is most striking is not merely that diplomacy
failed, but that it failed amid visible progress. Mediators were openly
discussing a viable framework; both sides had demonstrated flexibility – a
pathway to constrain nuclear escalation appeared tangible. Choosing military
escalation at that moment undermines the premise that negotiation is a genuine
alternative to war. It signals that even active diplomacy offers no guarantee
of restraint. Peace was not naïve. It was plausible.
Iran’s approach in Geneva was strategic, not submissive.
Proposals involving economic incentives – including
energy cooperation – were not unilateral concessions but calculated
compromises designed to structure a politically survivable agreement in
Washington. The core objective was clear: constrain Iran’s nuclear program
through enforceable limits and intrusive verification, thereby addressing the
very proliferation risks that sanctions and threats of force were meant to
prevent.
Talks had moved beyond rhetorical posturing toward
concrete proposals. For the first time in years, there was credible
movement toward stabilizing the nuclear issue. By attacking during that
negotiation window, Washington and its allies have not only derailed a
diplomatic opening but have cast doubt on the durability of American
commitments to negotiated solutions. The message to Tehran – and to other
adversaries weighing diplomacy – is stark: even when talks appear to work, they
can be overtaken by force.
Iran is not Iraq or Libya
Advocates of escalation often invoke Iraq in 2003 or
Libya in 2011 as precedents for rapid regime collapse under pressure. Those
analogies are misleading. Iraq and Libya were highly personalized systems,
overly dependent on narrow patronage networks and individual rulers. Remove the
center, and the structure imploded.
Iran is structurally different. It is not a dynastic
dictatorship but an ideologically entrenched state with layered institutions,
doctrinal legitimacy and a deeply embedded security apparatus, including the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. Its authority is intertwined with religious,
political and strategic narratives cultivated over decades. It has endured
sanctions, regional isolation and sustained external pressure without
fracturing.
Even a previous US-Israeli campaign in 2025 that lasted
12 days failed to eliminate Tehran’s retaliatory capacity. Far from collapsing,
the state absorbed
pressure and responded. Hitting such a system with maximum force does not
guarantee implosion; it may instead consolidate internal cohesion and reinforce
narratives of external aggression that the leadership has long leveraged.
The mirage of regime change
Rhetoric surrounding the strikes has already shifted from
tactical objectives to the language of regime change. US and Israeli leaders
framed military action not solely as neutralizing missile or nuclear
capabilities, but as an opportunity for Iranians to overthrow their government.
That calculus – regime change by force – is historically fraught with risk.
The Iraq invasion should be a cautionary tale. The US
spent more than a decade cultivating multiple Iraqi opposition groups – yet
dismantling the centralized state apparatus still produced chaos, insurgency
and fragmentation. The vacuum gave rise to extremist organizations such as IS,
drawing the US into years of renewed conflict.
Approaching Iran with similar assumptions ignores both
its institutional resilience and the complexity of regional geopolitics.
Sectarian divisions, entrenched alliances and proxy networks mean that destabilization
in Tehran would not remain contained. It could rapidly spill across borders and
harden into prolonged confrontation.
A region wired for escalation
Iran has invested
heavily in asymmetric capabilities precisely to deter and complicate
external intervention. Its missile, drone and naval systems are embedded along
the Strait of Hormuz — a chokepoint for global energy — and linked into a
network of regional allies and militias.
In the current escalation, Tehran has already launched retaliatory missile and drone strikes against US military bases and allied territories in the Gulf, hitting locations in Iraq, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (including Abu Dhabi), Kuwait and Qatar in direct response to US and Israeli strikes on Iran’s cities, including Tehran, Qom and Isfahan.
Explosions have been reported in Bahrain and the UAE, with
at least one confirmed fatality in Abu Dhabi, and several bases housing US
personnel have been struck or targeted, underscoring how the conflict has
already spread beyond Iran’s borders
A full-scale regional war is now more likely than it was
a week ago. Miscalculation could draw multiple states into conflict, inflame
sectarian fault lines and disrupt global energy markets. What might have
remained a contained nuclear dispute now risks expanding into a wider
geopolitical confrontation.
What about Trump’s promise of no more forever wars?
Trump built his political brand opposing “endless wars”
and criticizing the Iraq invasion. “America
First” promised strategic restraint, hard bargaining and an aversion
to open-ended intervention. Escalating militarily at the very moment diplomacy
was advancing sits uneasily with that doctrine and revives questions about the
true objectives of US strategy in the Middle East.
If a workable nuclear framework was genuinely emerging,
abandoning it in favor of escalation invites a deeper question: does sustained
tension serve certain strategic preferences more comfortably than durable
peace?
Trump’s
Mar-a-Lago address announcing the strikes carried unmistakable echoes
of George W. Bush
before the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Military action was framed as reluctant
yet necessary – a pre-emptive move to eliminate gathering threats and secure
peace through strength. The rhetoric of patience exhausted and danger
confronted before it fully materializes closely mirrors the language Bush used
to justify the march into Baghdad.
The parallel extends beyond tone. Bush cast the Iraq war
as liberation as well as disarmament, promising Iraqis freedom from
dictatorship. Trump similarly urged Iranians to reclaim their country,
implicitly linking force to regime change. In Iraq, that fusion of shock and
salvation produced not swift democratic renewal but prolonged instability. The
assumption that military force can reorder political systems from the outside
has already been tested – and its costs remain visible.
The central challenge now facing the US is not simply
Iran’s military capability. It is credibility. Abandoning negotiations
mid-course signals that diplomacy can be overridden by force even when progress
is visible. That perception will resonate far beyond Tehran.
Peace was never guaranteed. It was limited and imperfect,
focused primarily on nuclear constraints rather than human rights or regional
proxy networks. But it was plausible – and closer than many assumed. Breaking
the bridge while building it does more than halt a single agreement – it risks
convincing both sides that negotiation itself is futile.
In that world, trust erodes, deterrence hardens and
aggression – not agreement – becomes the default language of international
power. What we are witnessing is yet another clear indication that the
rules-based order has been consigned to the history books.
This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative
Commons license. Read the original
article.
Bamo Nouri is an Honorary Research Fellow, Department
of International Politics, at City, St George’s, University of London. CounterPunch

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