The 2011-2013 League of Women Voters of Illinois (LWVIL) Pension Study
[All bracketed assertions are my commentary.]
Membership in any pension or
retirement system of the State, any unit of local government or school
district, or any agency or instrumentality thereof, shall be an enforceable
contractual relationship, the benefits of which shall not be diminished or
impaired.
This section is interpreted to mean
that participation in a public pension system creates an enforceable contractual
relationship. Therefore, the State of Illinois has a legal obligation to pay employees
those benefits that have accrued to them under the applicable pension system.
With this Section 5 as background,
there are two sets of opposing legal arguments about changing current Illinois
public employees’ pensions: (1) the rules/regulations for current public employees’
pensions are based on the date of hire and cannot be changed without violating Section
5. (2) A current public employee’s pension benefits already accrued cannot be
changed, but future pension benefits can be changed without violating Section
5.
The first position is articulated in a
legal brief by Eric Madiar, Chief Legal Counsel to Illinois Senate President John
Cullerton. The second position is articulated in a legal brief/article by Sidley Austin law firm representing the
Civic Committee of the Commercial Club of Chicago. The State of Illinois has
fiscal responsibility for the funding of five (5) primary retirement systems: the
General Assembly Retirement System (GARS), the Judges’ Retirement System (JRS),
the State Employees’ Retirement System (SERS), the State Universities
Retirement System (SURS), and the Teachers' Retirement System (TRS).
Pension
Study Background
The State University Retirement System and the Teachers’ Retirement
System: These systems are considered "defined benefit" plans, [in other words] at
retirement employees will receive monthly annuities for life. The annuities are
based on several factors, including years of service, retirement age,
salary(ies) on which amount of pension is based, and other provisions. Employees
contribute a percentage of salary to their pension system. Contributions from
the state should be in an amount referred to as "normal cost plus interest."
The "normal cost" is the value of pension benefits earned during a particular
year. "Interest" is the amount needed to cover what is referred to as the
interest on the unfunded liability, which liability is generally defined as the
present value of the annuity payments earned to date and that will be paid in the
future minus the value of the
current assets of a plan. Illinois uses an [8.0%] rate for this interest calculation.
For a variety of reasons, Illinois has
not contributed all the funds needed to keep the five pension systems at the
levels usually recommended by the financial community. In addition, the State
has not earned expected rates of return on investments and actuarial assumptions
were not accurate. As a result, the five pension systems are severely
underfunded (calculated to be less than 50% funded), and the State currently does
not have the financial means to resolve this problem [unless, of course, the State restructures its antiquated revenue system and pension debt].
The current Illinois pension systems
seem to be unsustainable and create an overwhelming burden for the State. The
issues to be addressed are what changes can be made to the pension systems under
the Pension Clause; what type of system would be sustainable and appropriate
for Illinois going forward, and what safeguards may be put in place to prevent
problems of the current magnitude occurring again.
There are many suggestions out there as
to how to remedy the situation. Changes to the pension systems were made which
will impact employees hired after January 1, 2011 [SB 1946]. At issue are the 2011-2013
LWVIL Pension Study - Background 1: systems for employees
employed prior to January 1, 2011 and, in particular, interpretation of the portion
of the Illinois Constitution Pension Clause that states “…the
benefits of which shall not be diminished
or impaired” (Article XIII, Section 5).
There is legislation being considered
which would change the pension systems and, thus, possibly "diminish or impair"
employee benefits. Legal and political opinions are being made in favor of and
against any changes. The constitutionality of these changes is a major factor
in these opinions.
Summary of Legal Opinions on Issue
of Changes to Pension Systems
The main issue is whether Illinois can
make any changes in the pension
systems that may be interpreted
as having "diminished or impaired" the benefits
without violating the Pension Clause. Would any change in formula "impair or diminish"
the benefits? There are two memoranda which address these issues: One is Eric
Madiar’s opinion entitled Is Welching on
Public Pension Promises an Option for Illinois?
dated March 4, 2011, which makes the case that no changes would be allowed for
employees in the system prior to January 1, 2011 without the consent of each individual
member, since the Pension Clause specifically assigns the pension rights as “an
enforceable contractual relationship.”
The other is Sidley Austin’s response to Madiar, entitled “The
General Assembly’s Authority to Enact
Comprehensive Pension Reform
Legislation” dated April 11, 2011, which contends
that making changes that protect the future of the system as a whole are needed
to keep the systems from totally collapsing and, therefore, do not constitute "impairment
or diminishing" the system.
Sidley Austin has an earlier memorandum
on the subject dated December 7, 2010, entitled The
State of Illinois, and the City of
Chicago and Smaller Municipalities,
Are Not the Guarantors of The Payment
of Pension Benefits. Below is an attempt at condensing
both Sidley Austin's (“SA”) and
Madiar's (“M”) arguments into a point/counterpoint
summary:
SA: The Pension Clause
protects only benefits earned to date, not future benefits. Pensions are based
on "earned benefits" to that point. Future benefits are "expectations" and rely
on any number of factors, including continuation in service and salary.
M: Public
employees are already obligated to contribute and work in order to receive
pension benefits. Continued employment does not constitute acceptance of a
revised pension system because the only way to preserve rights under the existing
contract is to be forced to quit. Employees’ rights are secured under the
contract at the time of membership in the pension system.
SA: The Pension Clause is not
meant to protect pensions (a right) at the cost of state services (a duty of
the state). The framers of the 1970 Constitution rejected proposals for
requiring full funding.
M: SA
mis-characterizes the convention debates. Sponsors meant for Pension Clause to
protect the employees’ pension rights as a contract and enforceable in court.
While the framers rejected proposals for any required funding, contractual rights
of employees to pensions would make funding those pensions an "expectation."
SA: Legislation does not "diminish or impair" pension benefits since it would ultimately save the
systems from the underfunding issue. If Illinois were a corporation and could
consider bankruptcy, pension funds would be considered a contract right, not a
property right, and holders of contract rights are unsecured creditors.
M: The Pension
Clause constitutes a guarantee that the State will pay 100% of all pension
benefits, regardless of circumstances.
SA: Pension benefits
should be treated the same as salaries and health benefits, which can be
changed or modified. Of all state employees, only judges’ salaries are
protected from reduction during their service.
M: Each
of the State’s five pension codes has a similar provision of Obligations of the
State. From 2011-2013 LWVIL Pension Study -
Background 2: The payment
of the required department contributions,
all allowances, annuities, benefits granted
under this Article, and all expenses of administration
of the system are obligations of the State
of Illinois to the extent specified in this Article.”
The Pension Clause in itself puts pensions
in a different category than salaries and health
benefits.
Illinois Court Cases That Have
Rendered Decisions Impacting Pension Issues
1. Peters
v. City of Springfield., 57 Ill. 2d 142, 311 N.E.2d 107
(1974) (IL Supreme Court) addresses
City of Springfield ordinances that lowered the firemen’s retirement age from
63 to 60. Firemen argued that this change was beyond the City’s home rule
powers and that it impaired their ability to maximize their pensions by working
to age 63 [and, thus,] in violation of the Pension Clause. The trial court agreed with the
firemen, but the Supreme Court disagreed. The Supreme Court said that the City
was within its home rule powers and that the Pension Clause was not violated.
The Peters court determined that the Pension Clause was intended to “insure the
rights of public employees which had been earned and should not be diminished…”
This language in the Clause did not prevent the City from changing the retirement
age.
[Pension rights
are “earned.” There is no distinction between “earned” and “unearned” pension
benefits… “The Clause protects pension benefit rights as an enforceable
contractual relationship that is subject to modification through contract
principles.”]
2. Kraus
v. Board of Trustees, 72 Ill. App. 3d 833, 390 N.E.2d
1281 (1st Dist. 1979) (IL Appellate
Court): A police officer
went on disability due to an on-duty injury after 11 years of active service. When
he entered the force, in 1956, an officer could retire after 20 combined years
of active service and disability and could base retirement on the salary for
his rank when he elected to retire. In 1973, before the officer met the 20-year
requirement to retire, the legislature changed the Pension Code to give an
officer a pension based on his salary at the time he went on disability. The
police pension board thus based the officer’s retirement on his salary in 1967
rather than the salary for his rank in 1976 when he retired. The trial court reversed
the police pension board. The Appellate Court agreed with the trial court and
held that the amendment to the Pension Code (in 1973) could not apply to the
officer because the Pension Clause “entitled [him] to receive the benefits
under the relevant sections of the Pension Code as in effect at the time the
constitutional provision became effective in 1971.” The court said pension
rights became fixed when an employee entered the pension system or when the constitution
became operative, whichever was later, but not at retirement.
[Law existing at
the time of “vesting” is incorporated into employee’s agreement… Pension benefits
commence at the time employee contributions begin… General Assembly cannot
modify benefits. “The Clause protects pension benefit rights as an enforceable
contractual relationship that is subject to modification through contract
principles.”]
3. Felt
v. Board of Trustees of Judges Retirement System, 107
Ill. 2d 158, 481 N.E.2d 698 (1985) (IL
Supreme Court) involved a Pension
Code provision which
allowed judges to retire with a pension
based on their salary on their last day of service.
This was changed by the General Assembly
effective in 1982 to a pension based on the average salary during the last year
of service. Judges who entered service under the former
provision and retired after 1982 said application
of the Code change to them violated the Pension
Clause and the Contracts Clause. The trial court
agreed and so did the Supreme Court. The Illinois
Attorney General (arguing for the validity of the
legislature’s change) said that the legislature
could modify pension benefits under its police
power (that is, the power to act for the general
health safety and welfare of the public).
However, the Supreme Court said that the change
caused substantial impairment for the judges’
benefits. Madiar emphasizes that the Supreme
Court relied on Kraus (even though it is an
Appellate Court decision) in its analysis of this
case.
[…can’t diminish
terms of contract with pension system… In this particular case, pension is based upon salary of last day of
service or last year. “The Clause protects pension benefit rights as an
enforceable contractual relationship that is subject to modification through
contract principles.”]
4. Buddell
v. Bd. of Trustees, State University Retirement System, 118
Ill 2d. 99, 514 N.E.2d 184 (1987)
(IL Supreme Court) involved a
university employee
who entered SURS in 1969. At that time,
an employee could purchase service time for years
spent in military service. In 1974, the 2011-2013
LWVIL Pension Study - Background 3
of the Pension Code was amended to require current
employees to make that purchase of military
service time by September of 1974. The
employee attempted to purchase his military
service years in 1983, and the retirement system
denied his request. The trial court reversed. On
appeal, the Supreme Court upheld the trial court
and held that the employee was entitled to enforce
his right to purchase the service credit according
to the Pension Code as it was written when the
Pension Clause became effective. The Supreme
Court said “rights to exercise this option and
make these additional payments are contractual
rights by virtue of [the Pension Clause] and the
legislature cannot divest plaintiff of these rights.”
The Supreme Court found that Kraus was in
accord with its holding here.
[The courts found that the State can’t diminish
terms of contract with the pension systems… As stated, the Pension Code allows employees to purchase service credit for time
in the military.]
5. People
ex rel. Illinois Federation of Teachers v. Lindberg,
60 Ill. 2d 266, 268-70, 326 N.E.2d 749, 750-51 (1975) (IL
Supreme Court): Members of the teachers’ pension
systems and members of other systems filed a mandamus
action as a class to require the State to pay amounts originally appropriated
by the General Assembly to their retirement systems after the Governor exercised
his item reduction veto power to reduce the appropriated amounts. They contended
that the Pension Clause represented an enforceable, contractual right to have
their respective pension systems funded in an actuarially sound manner and that
the provisions of the Code were a binding obligation on the legislature that
could not be "impaired." The plaintiffs asked the court to restore the original
appropriation. The trial court dismissed the class action. The IL Supreme Court
concluded that the drafters of the Constitution did “not establish the intent
to constitutionally require a specific level of pension appropriations during a
fiscal year.”
6. People
ex rel. Sklodowski v. State of Illinois, 182 Ill. 2d
220, 695 N.E.2d 374 (1998) (IL
Supreme Court) was filed by
participants of the State’s five pension systems because of the State’s failure to make the pension
contributions prescribed by Public Act 86-274, which committed the State to
make additional pension contributions and pay the existing unfunded liabilities
of each system over a 40-year period. Plaintiffs claimed that in enacting Public Act
86-274 as part of the Pension Code, the legislature made its funding schedule
an enforceable contractual right under the Clause and that failure to follow that
schedule impaired their contractual rights. They sought a writ of mandamus
to force the IL comptroller and others to comply with the
Act’s funding schedule. The Court dismissed the complaint because the requested
relief would violate the separation of powers clause under the IL constitution.
During the plaintiffs’ appeal, the legislature passed Public Act 88-593, repealing the
earlier Act and establishing a less rigorous funding schedule. A motion to
dismiss was denied and the Appellate Court revised the trial court’s decision. In
its decision, the IL Supreme Court determined that (1) the Clause was included
to eliminate the distinction in legal protections afforded to mandatory and
optional pension plans prior to the 1970 Constitution; (2) the Clause “makes
participation in a public pension plan an enforceable contractual relationship
and also demands that the "benefits of that relationship” not be “diminished
or impaired” and (3) the contractual relationship is governed by the actual
terms of the Pension Code at the time the employee becomes a member of the
pension system. However, the Court reversed the appellate court and reaffirmed
that the Clause does not create a contractual basis to expect a particular
level of funding, but rather a right that they would receive the money due them
at retirement.
[A Vested Case
Issue: an employee acquires a “vested” right when he or she enters the pension
system. (See Lindberg ‘75/McNamee ‘96) “The Pension Clause does not create a contractual
basis for participants to expect a particular level of funding.”]
This Pension Study can be found at http://www.lwvil.org/Pension_Study_Background.pdf
The League of Women Voters of Illinois Pension Study
Committee:
Sharon Z. Alter, Mary
Klonowski , Rinda Allison, Nancy Kosobud, Sandra Bartholmey , Susan Morrison, Cheryl
Budzinski, Margaret O’Hara, Hollis Burgess, Dorcy Prosser, Georgia Gebhardt,
Nancy Smith, Karin Hribar and Marla Wilson