“Plenty
of observers have rushed to predict that the COVID-19 pandemic will seriously harm
the political fortunes of populists, or even make populism the
outbreak’s first ‘ideological casualty.’ Populists, they assert,
vilify experts; now we are all learning that the price of not listening to
experts may well be our own life. Populists, it is often said, are the great
simplifiers; now we need experienced bureaucrats and leaders who can deal with
a complex challenge.
“Yet,
this valiant attempt to see a silver lining in this political moment is itself
highly simplistic. Populism is not primarily characterised by hostility to scientists.
Populists in power are likely to benefit from a ‘rally-around-the-flag’
dynamic, unless they appear as do-nothing retrogrades like Jair Bolsonaro or
Andrés Manuel López-Obrador. More importantly, populists can still
deploy their key strategy of dividing citizens against each other and blaming
minorities for all sorts of problems. It is too early to tell whether that strategy
will work — much will depend on the length of various lockdowns and the
frustrations as well as economic dislocations generated by them. But it is
certainly not too early to say that the Panglossian liberal gloating about an
end of populism is premature.
What do populists want?
“Conventional wisdom has it that
populism is about opposition to elites. But that understanding is superficial.
After all, keeping a close eye on the powerful can just as well be a sign of
good, vigilant citizenship. It is true that populist politicians, when in
opposition, criticise governments (and other political parties). But they also
do something else: they claim that they, and only they,
represent what populists frequently call ‘the real people’ or also ‘the silent
majority.’ This might not sound so bad; it is not immediately the same as, for
instance, racism or a hatred of global governance.
“But such a claim to a monopoly of
properly representing the people has two detrimental consequences for
democracy: for one thing, populists declare all other contenders for power to
be fundamentally illegitimate. This is never just a matter of differences over
policies or even values; rather, other politicians are vilified as corrupt
characters. What Donald Trump said about his rival in the 2016 presidential
election was extreme, but it was not exceptional: all populists try to convince
electorates that other politicians are simply ‘crooked.’
“Less obviously, populists also claim
that all those citizens who do not support their vision of the ‘real people’ —
and therefore tend not to opt for populists at the ballot box — might not
properly belong to the people at all. Trump does not reject criticisms with
arguments; he simply labels the critics ‘Unamerican.’ Turkish President
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan says about himself and his party, ‘We are the people’ and
then turns to his critics with the question, ‘Who are you?’
“Populists frequently invoke the unity
of the people. But it is always unity on their terms. And
these terms are political and, in the case of right-wing populists, distinctly
cultural, if not outright ethnic. Already vulnerable minorities and opposition
voices get vilified, because they do not conform to the image of the people
which populists put forward. Thus, dividing the people is the political
business model of populists; culture war is not incidental, but an essential
part of their strategy: whenever they can, they will try to reduce policy
questions to questions of who really belongs to the people and who does not.
Will COVID-19 legitimise populist politics?
“It
is true that a number of far-right populists used to dominating the news cycle
seem to have been side-lined by the COVID-19 crisis. Little is heard these days
from Matteo Salvini, the once supposedly inevitable next prime minister of
Italy. As one perceptive
analyst put it:
‘Salvini is neither a minister nor someone the
media would ask to explain Italy’s strategy on COVID-19. His political
megaphone has been confiscated by the Civil Protection Agency, the regional
authorities, and the government.’
“The
German far-right party Alternative
für Deutschland (AfD) is down in the polls, consumed by
infighting instead of capitalising on any discontent with Germany’s grand
coalition government. Not unreasonably, some observers are starting to ask
whether all the policy issues which far-right populists appear to ‘own’ are not
in fact luxury problems when statesmen and stateswomen focused on
life-and-death decisions are needed in politics. Who has time to worry about a
few dozen people wearing or not wearing burkas and niqabs, when all of us are
ordered to put on face masks in public?
“But
that conclusion, again, is too hasty. For one, populists in power also
benefit from a ‘rally-around-the-flag’ effect; the sense of being-at-war has
hardly been bad for any half-way capable leader. This surge in popularity
is virtually guaranteed in countries where populists have radically reduced
media pluralism — think Hungary, India, or Russia. Even if governments are
badly mishandling the situation, or if the emergency reveals the extent to
which, for instance, the kleptocracy of a Viktor Orbán has diminished the
public health-care system, any bad news can be effectively buried.
“Populists
often conjure up pseudo-crises and generate a sense of conflict; at the moment,
populist-in-power have a real crisis which allows them to assert what has
sometimes been called a
primacy of politics. Rather than simply having policy dictated by
economic imperatives, governments can demonstrate that concentrated political
will can make a difference. This notion of a primacy of politics is not exclusive
to populists.
“As
the political scientist Sheri Berman has
argued, it also characterised Social Democrats and fascists in the twentieth
century: both rejected the subordination of politics to economics (be it in the
form of orthodox Marxism or neoclassical economics). The more Social Democrats,
as well the centre-right, aligned themselves with neoliberalism in the past
decades, the easier it became for populists to present themselves as the only
actors who retained some faith in politics.
“Such
a belief in decisive political action has been demonstrated by actors across
the political spectrum in recent weeks, albeit sometimes with literally fatal
delays. It could seem that some of the action undertaken will play straight
into the hands of the populist right: closing borders and putting one’s own
nation first. It is true that such measures — especially if they persist over
longer periods — can legitimise positions long established by prominent
populists: Viktor Orbán built his first border fence in 2015; now visible and
invisible walls are going up everywhere.
“But
this outcome — a global threat legitimising a new nasty strand of nativism — is
by no means inevitable. For one thing, closing-in is clearly not the actual
solution to COVID-19. Plus, it was in any case not true that we had a
completely open world before. Contrary to the image conjured up self-declared ‘anti-globalists,’
virtually no figure of political consequence had ever advocated a completely
borderless world: free flow of goods and capital, up to a point; and also
frequent fliers with the right kind of passport (or usually passports, too),
but certainly not ‘open borders’ for human beings.
“Most
importantly, the outcome of the pandemic — and how its lessons are perceived —
are still very much in the hands of political leaders. They can make the case
that it was actual cross-border cooperation, not least among scientists, that
contributed to overcoming the crisis. Of course, it would help if the European
Union demonstrated greater capacity to
organise financial and other help across borders; so far, the replay of the
Eurocrisis — cries for help from Southern Europe greeted with a firm Nein from Germany and the other
members of the frugal four (Netherlands,
Austria, Finland) — does not bode well. But even if there won’t be ‘coronabonds’
to deal with the economic fallout, it is unlikely that national autarchy or
comprehensive global ‘de-coupling’ will emerge as the obvious panacea from
the pandemic.
‘Trickle-down aggression.’
“Depending on how long the emergency persists,
populists might use their usual playbook and actively sow division, or even
hatred. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán not only took advantage of
COVID-19 to implement further autocratic measures, he also deployed the usual
conspiracy theories according to which criticism of his government is only ever
voiced by paid-up members of the George Soros International. He expelled a
group of Iranian students, and made a point of saying that his government is
focused ‘on saving the lives of the Hungarian people’; whereas, by contrast,
the president of his neighbouring country, in a televised speech, addressed
himself to ‘Austrians’ and ‘those who live here.’ Orbán also strained to equate the
virus and migrants: ‘We are fighting a two-front war. One front is called
migration, and the other one belongs to the coronavirus. There is a logical
connection between the two, as both spread with movement.’
“Trump
and his right-wing enablers, in turn, are super-spreading a vicious language in
which ‘Chinese virus’ and ‘Wuhan virus’ are obligatory terms (and a sign of
loyalty to the boss). As on previous occasions, the rhetoric at the very top
has had effects on the ground, as Asian-Americans are being assaulted.
What the philosopher Kate Manne has
called ‘trickle-down aggression’ is likely to be a lasting effect of the
populist portrayal of COVID-19.
“In the United States, the absorption of
COVID-19 into the culture war strategy of right-wing populists is already a
fact. Fox News and Rush Limbaugh framed the pandemic as a liberal conspiracy;
Trump himself originally called it a ‘new hoax’ by the Democrats.
As recently as 25 March, he tweeted: ‘The LameStream Media is the dominant force in trying to get me to keep
our Country closed as long as possible in the hope that it will be detrimental
to my election success. The real people want to get back to work ASAP. We will
be stronger than ever before!’
“The
most visible American expert — director of the US National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases, Dr Anthony Fauci — has become an object of hate on
the right in ways that remain unimaginable in most other democracies. ‘Liberal
cosmopolitans’ and big cities — New York foremost — will also likely be blamed
for whatever goes wrong with mitigation.
“As a number of important studies have
demonstrated, the United States is unique in that it features a virtually
self-enclosed right-wing media ecosphere whose denizens have virtually no
contact even with outlets like the Wall
Street Journal, which could, at least on occasion, serve as a
corrective to conspiracy theories and forms of misinformation (or outright
disinformation).
“In
such a context, it is naïve to think that the obvious importance of science
(and the obvious incompetence of the Trump administration) would directly translate
into a blow against far-right populism. It may well be that, as one global risk
consultant noted, ‘self-isolation provides people with more
time to look for information.’ But given the shape of the media landscape in
the United States, plenty of people might simply use all that time to gather
even more misinformation and disinformation than usual.
Suffering the legacy of neoliberalism
“In the same vein, it would be naïve to think
that the pandemic will necessarily lead to a greater sense of solidarity — even
if it’s become a lot clearer how much citizens depend on each other. Nor will
it inevitably result in stronger states.
“To
be sure, in many countries, the crisis has exposed existing structural problems
— such as the absence of a proper health care system in the United States and
the weaknesses of an administrative state purposefully gutted by the Trumpists
(remember Steve Bannon calling for its ‘deconstruction’). It is entirely
reasonable to argue that decades of neoliberalism have left states vulnerable
and exposed. Right-wing
populists, even if they often talk the talk of opposing neoliberalism and ‘international
elites,’ have usually continued this trend: so Orbán criticises European
multinationals, but also rolls out the red carpet for the German car industry
and companies like Bosch.
“But how these terminal legacies of
neoliberalism are understood and possibly overcome is very much up to
politicians and intellectuals. Less obviously, it will matter whether the left,
which in theory could benefit from a new emphasis on state capacities, can find
an institutional form to mobilise citizens.
“After
2008, it experimented with different movements and parties based on
digital platforms which would have made it easier to
participate in politics (Podemos and La France Insoumise are
the obvious examples). These had lasting influence in Southern Europe, but
never managed in the end to reverse austerity policies.
“It is largely forgotten that not only the
financial crisis, but also 9/11, initially unleased an inflationary rhetoric of
‘shared sacrifice,’ collective purpose and an age of state responsibility
replacing a frivolous period of individual hedonism. Yet in the end those who
benefited most were private contractors — instead of a collective purpose
sustained by the citizenry, particular state tasks were outsourced to the likes
of Blackwater.
“Such a future of individual contracting
instead of collective purpose is also entirely possible as a legacy of the
present crisis. The very real suffering caused by COVID-19, rather than
inspiring structural reform, might become part of the narratives circulating in
a right-wing culture of grievances, carefully tended by populists who make
majorities feel like minorities under siege. Even if the enemy is invisible,
the lived experience of vulnerability might still be incorporated into the
populist playbook” (ABC Religion & Ethics).
Jan-Werner Müller is Professor of Politics at Princeton University. His
books include What is Populism? An
earlier version of this piece appeared in World Politics Review. You can hear
Professor Müller discuss the effect of the COVID-19 pandemic on democratic
politics with Waleed Aly and Scott Stephens on The
Minefield.
No comments:
Post a Comment
Note: Only a member of this blog may post a comment.