“…JUST WAR THEORY
offers a series of principles that aim to retain a plausible moral framework
for war.
From the just war (justum bellum) tradition, theorists distinguish
between the rules that govern the justice of war (jus ad bellum) from
those that govern just and fair conduct in war (jus In bello) and the
responsibility and accountability of warring parties after the war (jus post
bellum). The three aspects are by no means mutually exclusive, but they
offer a set of moral guidelines for waging war that are neither unrestricted
nor too restrictive. The problem for ethics involves expounding the guidelines
in particular wars or situations.
“The principles
of the justice of war are commonly held to be: [1.] Having just cause, [2.] Being a last resort, [3.] Being declared by a
proper authority, [4.] Possessing right intention, [5.] Having a reasonable
chance of success, and [6.] The end being proportional to the means used.
“One can
immediately detect that the principles are not wholly intrinsicist nor
consequentialist—they invoke the concerns of both models. Whilst this provides
just war theory with the advantage of flexibility, the lack of a strict ethical
framework means that the principles themselves are open to broad
interpretations. Examining each in turn draws attention to the relevant
problems.
“Possessing just
cause is the first and arguably the most important condition of jus ad
bellum. Most theorists hold that initiating acts of
aggression is unjust and gives a group a just cause to defend itself. But
unless ‘aggression’ is defined, this proscription is rather open-ended. For
example, just cause resulting from an act of aggression can ostensibly be a
response to a physical injury (for example, a violation of territory), an
insult (an aggression against national honor), a trade embargo (an aggression
against economic activity), or even to a neighbor’s prosperity (a violation of
social justice).
“The
onus is then on the just war theorist to provide a consistent and sound account
of what is meant by just cause. Whilst not going into the reasons why the other
explanations do not offer a useful condition of just cause, the consensus is
that an initiation of physical force is wrong and may justly be resisted. Self-defense
against physical aggression, therefore, is putatively the only sufficient
reason for just cause. Nonetheless, the principle of self-defense can be
extrapolated to anticipate probable acts of aggression, as well as in assisting
others against an oppressive government or from another external threat
(interventionism). Therefore, it is commonly held that aggressive war is only
permissible if its purpose is to retaliate against a wrong already committed
(for example, to pursue and punish an aggressor), or to pre-empt an anticipated
attack.
“In
recent years, the argument for preemption has gained supporters in the West:
surely, the argument goes, it is right on consequentialist grounds to strike
the first blow if a future war is to be avoided. By acting decisively against a
probable aggressor, a powerful message is sent that a nation will defend itself
with armed force; thus preemption may provide a deterrent and a more peaceful
world.
However, critics complain that preemptive strikes are based on conjectured
rather than impending aggression and in effect denounce the moral principle
that an agent is presumed innocent – posturing and the building up of armaments
do not in themselves constitute aggression, just as a man carrying a weapon is
not a man using a weapon, Consequentialist critics may also reject preemption
on the grounds that it is more likely to destabilize peace, while other
realists may complain that a preemptive strike policy is the ploy of a
tyrannical or bullying power that justifies other nations to act in their
self-interest to neutralize either through alliances or military action – such
is the principle behind the ‘balance of power’ politics in which nations
constantly renew their alliances and treatises to ensure that not one of them
becomes a hegemonic power.
“It
is also feared that the policy of preemption slips easily into the machinations
of ‘false flag operations’ in which a pretext for war is created by a contrived
theatrical or actual stunt – of dressing one’s own soldiers up in the enemy’s
uniforms, for instance, and having them attack a military or even civilian
target so as to gain political backing for a war. Unfortunately, false flag
operations tend to be quite common. Just war theory would reject them as it
would reject waging war to defend a leader’s ‘honor’ following an insult.
Realists may defend them on grounds of a higher necessity but such moves are
likely to fail as being smoke screens for political rather than moral
interests.
“War should
always be a last resort. This connects intimately with presenting a
just cause – all other forms of solution must have been attempted prior to the
declaration of war. It has often been recognized that war unleashes forces and
powers that soon get beyond the grips of the leaders and generals to control –
there is too much ‘fog’ in war, as Clausewitz noted, but that fog is also a
moral haze in which truth and trust are early casualties. The resulting damage
that war wrecks tends to be very high for most economies and so theorists have
advised that war should not be lightly accepted: once unleashed, war is not
like a sport that can be quickly stopped at the blow of a whistle (although the
Celtic druids supposedly had the power to stop a battle by virtue of their
moral standing) and its repercussions last for generations. Holding ‘hawks’ at
bay though is a complicated task – the apparent ease by which war may resolve
disputes, especially in the eyes of those whose military might is apparently
great and victory a certainty, does present war as a low cost option relative
to continuing political problems and economic or moral hardship. Yet the just
war theorist wishes to underline the need to attempt all other solutions but
also to tie the justice of the war to the other principles of jus ad bellum too.
“The notion of
proper authority seems
to be resolved for most of the theorists, who claim it obviously resides in the
sovereign power of the state. But the concept of sovereignty raises a
plethora of issues to consider here. If a government is just, i.e., most
theorists would accept that the government is accountable and does not rule
arbitrarily, then giving the officers of the state the right to declare war is
reasonable, so the more removed from a proper and just form a government is,
the more reasonable it is that its claim to justifiable political sovereignty
disintegrates.
“A
historical example can elucidate the problem: when Nazi Germany invaded France
in 1940 it set up the Vichy puppet regime. What allegiance did the people of
France under its rule owe to its precepts and rules? A Hobbesian rendition of
almost absolute allegiance to the state entails that resistance is wrong (so
long as the state is not tyrannical and imposes war when it should be
the guardian of peace); whereas a Lockean or instrumentalist conception of the
state entails that a poorly accountable, inept, or corrupt regime possesses no
sovereignty, and the right of declaring war (to defend themselves against the
government or from a foreign power) is wholly justifiable. The notion of proper
authority therefore requires thinking about what is meant by sovereignty, what
is meant by the state, and what is the proper relationship between a people and
its government.
“The possession
of right intention is
ostensibly less problematic. The general thrust of the concept being that a
nation waging a just war should be doing so for the cause of justice and not
for reasons of self-interest or aggrandizement. Putatively, a just war cannot
be considered to be just if reasons of national interest are paramount or
overwhelm the pretext of fighting aggression. However, ‘right intention’ masks
many philosophical problems. According to Kant, possessing good intent
constitutes the only condition of moral activity, regardless of the
consequences envisioned or caused, and regardless, or even in spite, of any
self interest in the action the agent may have. The extreme intrinsicism of
Kant can be criticized on various grounds, the most pertinent here being the
value of self-interest itself.
“At
what point does right intention separate itself from self-interest – is the
moral worthiness of intent only gained by acting in favor of one’s neighbor,
and if so, what does that imply for moral action – that one should woo one’s
neighbor’s spouse to make him/her feel good? Acting with proper intent requires
us to think about what is proper and it is not certain that not acting in
self-interest is necessarily the proper thing to do.
“On
the one hand, if the only method to secure a general peace (something usually
held to be good in itself) is to annex a belligerent neighbor's territory,
political aggrandizement becomes intimately connected with the proper intention
of maintaining the peace for all or the majority. On the other hand, a nation
may possess just cause to defend an oppressed group, and may rightly argue that
the proper intention is to secure their freedom, yet such a war may justly be
deemed too expensive or too difficult to wage; i.e., it is not ultimately in
their self-interest to fight the just war. On that account, the realist may
counter that national interest is paramount: only if waging war on behalf of
freedom is also complemented by the securing of economic or other military
interests should a nation commit its troops. The issue of intention raises the
concern of practicalities as well as consequences, both of which should be
considered before declaring war.
“The next
principle is that of reasonable success. This is another necessary condition
for waging just war, but again is insufficient by itself. Given just cause and
right intention, the just war theory asserts that there must be a reasonable
probability of success. The principle of reasonable success is consequentialist
in that the costs and benefits of a campaign must be calculated. However, the
concept of weighing benefits poses moral as well as practical problems as evinced
in the following questions:
“Should
one not go to the aid of a people or declare war if there is no conceivable
chance of success? Is it right to comply with aggression because the costs of
not complying are too prohibitive? Would it be right to crush a weak enemy
because it would be marginally costless? Is it not sometimes morally necessary
to stand up to a bullying larger force, as the Finns did when Russia invaded in
1940, for the sake of national self-esteem or simple interests of defending
land?
“Historically,
many nations have overcome the probability of defeat: the fight may seem
hopeless, but a charismatic leader or rousing speech can sometimes be enough to
stir a people into fighting with all their will. Winston Churchill offered the
British nation some of the finest of war's rhetoric when it was threatened with
defeat and invasion by Nazi Germany in 1940. For example: ‘Let us therefore
brace ourselves to do our duty, and so bear ourselves that, if the British
Commonwealth and its Empire lasts for a thousand years, men will still say,
'This was their finest hour.’….And ‘What is our aim? Victory, victory at all
costs, victory in spite of all terror; victory, however long and hard the road
may be; for without victory, there is no survival.’ (Speeches to Parliament,
1940). However, the thrust of the reasonable success principle emphasizes that
human life and economic resources should not be wasted in what would obviously
be an uneven match. For a nation threatened by invasion, other forms of
retaliation or defense may be available, such as civil disobedience, or even forming
alliances with other small nations to equalize the odds.
“The final guide
of jus ad bellum is that the desired end should be proportional to the
means used. This principle overlaps into the moral
guidelines of how a war should be fought, namely the principles of jus In
bello. With regards to just cause, a policy of war requires a goal, and
that goal must be proportional to the other principles of just cause. Whilst
this commonly entails the minimizing of war's destruction, it can also invoke
general balance of power considerations.
“For
example, if nation A invades a land belonging to the people of nation B, then B
has just cause to take the land back. According to the principle of
proportionality, B’s counter-attack must not invoke a disproportionate
response: it should aim to retrieve its land and not exact further retribution
or invade the aggressor’s lands, or in graphic terms it should not retaliate
with overwhelming force or nuclear weaponry to resolve a small border dispute.
That goal may be tempered with attaining assurances that no further invasion
will take place, but for B to invade and annex regions of A is nominally a
disproportionate response, unless (controversially) that is the only method for
securing guarantees of no future reprisals. For B to invade and annex A, and
then to continue to invade neutral neighboring nations on the grounds that
their territory would provide a useful defense against other threats and a
putative imbalance of power is even more unsustainable.
“On
the whole, the principles offered by jus ad bellum are useful guidelines
for reviewing the morality of going to war that are not tied to the
intrinsicist’s absolutism or consequentialist’s open-endedness.
Philosophically, however, they invoke a plethora of problems by either their
independent vagueness or by mutually inconsistent results – a properly declared
war may involve improper intention or disproportionate ambitions. But war is a
complicated issue and the principles are nonetheless a useful starting point
for ethical examination and they remain a guide for both statesmen and women
and for those who judge political proceedings…”
