After an unusual delay, the Supreme Court finally issued
its first opinion of the term on Monday: a unanimous decision in Arellano v.
McDonough siding against disabled veterans who seek
compensation for disabilities related to their service. Justice Amy Coney
Barrett’s opinion for the court denied these veterans (and their survivors) the
ability to obtain benefits retroactively if they filed a late claim—even if the
delay occurred because of their disability, or some other
factor beyond their control.
It’s a painful blow to military members who were injured
while serving their country, and a puzzling one: At oral arguments, the
justices sounded divided, yet all three liberals lined up behind Barrett’s
harsh opinion. Maybe they genuinely believed that Congress intended to impose
an exceedingly stringent deadline on disabled veterans. Or perhaps the
three-justice minority is so outnumbered that it has decided to pick its
battles, and Arellano was not worth the fight.
The facts of the case deserve more attention than Barrett
gave them. Adolfo Arellano served in the Navy from 1977 until he was honorably
discharged in 1981. During his service, he worked on an aircraft carrier that
collided with a freighter in the Persian Gulf. Arellano was nearly swept
overboard, and he saw his shipmates get crushed to death. After this incident,
he began showing symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder,
schizophrenia, and tardive dyskinesia. These conditions rendered him
severely disabled and incapacitated, and ever since, his brother has served as
his legal guardian and caregiver.
Because of his incapacitation, Arellano did not understand
that he qualified for disability compensation. His brother did not find out
until 2011, at which point he filed a claim on Arellano’s behalf, asking for
retroactive benefits for the previous 30 years. The Department of Veterans
Affairs granted compensation moving forward, but denied compensation for the
past three decades. It said that federal law allows retroactive
compensation only if service members file “within one year of
discharge,” which Arellano did not.
But that law wasn’t the end of the story. The Supreme Court
has long held that statutes of limitation are subject
to a presumption of “equitable tolling.” That just means a deadline can be suspended
when some “extraordinary circumstance” prevented a party from raising their
claim on time. The doctrine reaches back to the founding era and has always
served as a “background principle” whenever Congress drafts statutes of
limitations. It does not apply, however, when ignoring a deadline
would be “inconsistent with statutory text.”
There are several
very good reasons why equitable tolling should apply here. First, the Supreme
Court has said that “interpretive doubt” must be read in favor of
veterans; as Justice Antonin Scalia once noted, this rule is “more like a fist than a thumb” on the scale,
“as it should be.” Second, the broader statute expresses special solicitude toward veterans as they navigate a bureaucratic
maze in search of their rightful benefits—precisely the context in which
equitable tolling would normally apply.
Third, there are practical reasons to suspend the deadline
here. Many service members were subject to excruciating and unethical chemical
testing, most notoriously at the Edgewood Arsenal from 1955 to 1975,
then threatened with criminal charges if they disclosed their experience.
Victims of this military-administered torture did not file claims for
compensation within a year for fear of prosecution. In 2006, the government
declared it would not prosecute Edgewood victims for acknowledging their abuse.
But by that time, the one-year deadline for retroactive compensation claims had
long since passed.
Finally, even outside these devastating cases, there
are plenty of reasons why veterans and their
survivors are prevented from filing within a year of discharge. Some, like
Arellano, have psychiatric disorders that prevent them from pursuing a claim.
Others suffer disabilities that do not present themselves until more than one year
after service. And still more get shafted by bureaucratic blunders: One
survivor, for instance, filed a claim on time but was falsely told by the VA
that she was too young to qualify. Years later, she realized the VA was wrong
and filed a claim for retroactive compensation. The VA rejected it because the one-year deadline
had passed.
This stringent interpretation of the law has tragic
consequences. Service members and their survivors are denied years’ or decades’
worth of compensation because problems outside their control prevented them
from filing promptly. For that reason, multiple veterans’ groups urged the Supreme Court to suspend the one-year deadline when fairness requires
it—a coalition that included Disabled American Veterans, National Organization
of Veterans’ Advocates, and Paralyzed Veterans of America.
But SCOTUS refused, siding against Arellano’s request for
equitable tolling. Why? Barrett, a former civil procedure professor, ignored
the principle of solicitude toward veterans in favor of a wooden analysis of
the “statutory scheme.” She focused on the fact that federal law includes 16
explicit exceptions to the general rule that veterans can’t get retroactive
compensation—and equitable tolling isn’t one of them. “The presence of this
detailed, lengthy list,” Barrett wrote, “raises the inference that the
enumerated exceptions are exclusive.” Put differently, it is “difficult to see”
why Congress “spelled out a long list” if it did not want the list to be
comprehensive.
As Chief Justice John Roberts noted at oral arguments, though, this list
of exceptions could cut both ways. It might suggest “that the insistence upon
strict enforcement is really not that important.” Rather, Roberts said, “the
plethora of exceptions seems to me to make it more likely that you ought to
stick with the normal rule” of equitable tolling. When Congress creates so many
other exceptions to the deadline, Roberts continued, how does it “make any
sense” to say the “one area” where equitable principles won’t apply
“is service-connected disabilities?”
This argument carried great weight given that, as deputy
solicitor general, Roberts argued
and won the foundational case on this topic. As a matter of
common sense, it’s also a strong counterpoint to Barrett’s logic: Shouldn’t the
presence of so many exceptions indicate that Congress did not want
rigid enforcement of the one-year deadline?
Yet Roberts signed onto Barrett’s opinion in favor of
the VA. So did every other justice—including Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and
Ketanji Brown Jackson, all of whom sounded skeptical of the VA’s position
during oral arguments. For all we know, they ultimately decided that Barrett
got it right, and that Congress intended to subject veterans like Arellano to
its harsh deadline.
It’s also possible that the term is
filled with so many contentious cases already that no justice wanted to eat up
her time writing a dissent in a relatively minor case when the outcome was
inevitable anyway. After all, the ongoing backlog of opinions indicates that
the justices are taking an unusually long time to write—possibly because of
extensive disagreements and bad blood behind the scenes.
If that’s the reason for the unanimity in Arellano,
it’s a shame. A seemingly small case like this one can make a huge
difference in the lives of real people. Disabled veterans deserved a fairer
shake than they received from this court.
-Mark Joseph Stern, Slate
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