On Friday, December 2,
President Joe Biden signed into law House Joint Resolution 100, “which provides
for a resolution with respect to the unresolved disputes between certain
railroads represented by the National Carriers’ Conference Committee of the
National Railway Labor Conference and certain of their employees.”
What
that long title means is that the U.S. government has overridden the usual
union ratification procedures of a tentative agreement to hammer out
differences between employers and the 115,000 workers covered by the agreement.
Eight of the 12 involved unions had agreed to the deal, which provides 24% wage
increases but no sick days, and four had not.
Their
refusal to agree seemed almost certain to lead to a strike in which all the
unions would participate, shutting down key supply chains and badly hurting the
U.S. economy. Some estimated the costs of a strike would be about $2 billion a
day, freezing almost 30% of freight shipments by weight, and causing a crisis
in all economic sectors—including retail, just before the holidays. It would
also disrupt travel for up to 7 million commuters a day and stop about 6300
carloads of food every day from moving. So the government stepped in.
Biden
asked Congress on Monday, November 28, to
act to prevent a rail strike, but there was a long history behind this
particular measure, and an even longer one behind the government’s pressure on
railroad workers.
The
story behind today’s crisis started in
2017 when former president Trump’s trade war hammered agriculture and
manufacturing, leading railroad companies to fire workers—more than 20,000 of
them in 2019 alone, dropping the number of railroad workers in the U.S. below
200,000 for the first time since the Department of Labor began to keep track of
such statistics in the 1940s. By December 2020,
the industry had lost 40,000 jobs, most of them among the people who actually
operated the trains.
Those
jobs did not come back even after the economy did, though, as railroad
companies implemented a system called precision scheduled railroading, or PSR.
“We fundamentally changed the way we operate over the last 2½ years,” Bryan
Tucker, vice president of communications at railroad corporation CSX told
Heather Long of the Washington Post in January
2020. “It’s a different way of running a railroad.”
PSR
made trains longer and operated them with a skeleton crew that was held to a
strict schedule. This dramatically improved on-time delivery rates but
sometimes left just two people in charge of a train two to three miles long,
with no back-up and no option for sick days, family emergencies, or any of the
normal interruptions that life brings, because the staffing was so lean it
depended on everyone being in place. Any disruption in schedules brought
disciplinary action and possible job loss. Workers got an average of 3 weeks’
vacation and holidays, but the rest of their time, including weekends, was
tightly controlled, while smaller crews meant more dangerous working
conditions.
PSR
helped the railroad corporations make record profits. In 2021, revenue for the
two largest railroad corporations in the U.S., the Union Pacific and BNSF
(owned by Warren Buffett), jumped 12% to $21.8 billion and 11.6% to $22.5
billion, respectively.
About
three years ago, union leaders and railroad management began negotiating new
contracts but had little luck. In July, Biden established a Presidential
Emergency Board (PEB) to try to resolve the differences. The PEB’s August
report called for significant wage increases but largely kicked down the road
the problems associated with PSR. The National Carriers Conference Committee,
which represents the railroads, called the report “fair and appropriate”; not
all of the involved unions did.
And
here is the deeper historical background to this issue: the government has no final
power to force railroad owners to meet workers’ demands. In 1952, in the midst
of the Korean War, believing that steel companies were being unreasonable in
their unwillingness to bargain with workers, President Harry S. Truman seized
control of steel production facilities to prevent a strike that would stop the
production of steel defense contractors needed. But, in the Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer decision, the Supreme Court
said that the president could not seize private property unless Congress
explicitly authorized it to do so. This means that the government has very
little leverage over corporations to force them to meet workers’ demands.
But,
thanks to the 1926 Railway Labor Act, Congress can force railroad workers to
stay on the job. The 1926 law was one of the first laws on the books to try to
stop strikes by providing a mechanism for negotiations between workers and
employers. But if the two sides cannot agree after a long pattern of
negotiations and cooling off periods, Congress can impose a deal that both
sides have to honor.
The
idea was to force both sides to bargain, but a key player in this policy was
the American consumer, who had turned harshly against railroad workers when the
two-month 1894 Pullman Strike, after drastic wage cuts, shut down the country.
For the most part, Americans turned against the strikers as travel became
diabolically difficult and goods stopped moving. Even reformer Jane Addams, who
generally sympathized with workers, worried that the economic crisis had made
forgiving the strikers “well-nigh impossible.”
While
management generally likes the current system, workers point out that it
removes their most effective leverage. Employers can always count on Congress
to step in to avoid a railroad strike that would bring the country’s economy to
its knees. On November 28, CNN Business reported
that more than 400 business groups were asking Congress to enforce the
tentative deal in order to prevent a strike. At the same time, the Supreme
Court in 1952 took away the main leverage the government had against
companies.
And
so the House passed the measure forcing the unions to accept the tentative deal
on Wednesday, November 30, by
a vote of 290 to 137. Two hundred and eleven (211) Democrats voted yes; 8 voted
no. Seventy-nine (79) Republicans voted yes; 129 voted no.
But
then the House promptly took up a measure, House Concurrent Resolution 119, to
correct the bill by providing a minimum of 7 paid sick days for the employees
covered by the agreement. That, too, passed, by a vote of 221 to 207, with
three Republicans joining all the Democrats to vote yes. Those three
Republicans were Don Bacon (R-NE), who has gotten attention lately for trying
to carve a space for himself away from the rest of the party as someone concerned
about practical matters; Brian Fitzpatrick (R-PA); and John Katko (R-NY).
It
was a neat way for Congress to impose its will on the companies under the terms
of the Railway Labor Act.
The
Senate approved the bill on Thursday by
a vote of 80 to 15, with Rand Paul (R-KY) voting “present” and four others not
voting. The 80 yes votes were bipartisan and so were the 15 no votes. Five
Democrats—Kirsten Gillibrand (D-NY), John Hickenlooper (D-CO), Jeff Merkley
(D-OR), Elizabeth Warren (D-MA), and Bernie Sanders (I-VT)—joined ten
Republicans to oppose the measure.
Then
the Senate took up the concurrent resolution, which it rejected by a vote of 52
yes votes to 43 no votes, with five not voting. That is, the measure won a
majority—52 votes—but because of the current understanding of the filibuster
rule, the Senate cannot pass a measure without a supermajority of 60 votes. The
yes votes for the sick leave addition were nearly all Democrats, along with six
Republicans. The no votes were all Republicans, with the addition of one
Democrat: Joe Manchin of West Virginia.
Biden
maintains he supports paid sick leave for all workers, not just railroad
workers, and promises to continue to work for it.
But
the railway struggle was about more than sick leave. It was about a system that
has historically made it harder for workers than for employers to get what they
want. And it is about consumers, who—in the past at any rate—have blamed
strikers rather than management when the trains stopped running.
—Heather Cox Richardson
Notes:
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1172/vote_117_2_00372.htm
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/119/text
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-concurrent-resolution/119/actions
https://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/roll_call_votes/vote1172/vote_117_2_00371.htm
https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2022491
https://clerk.house.gov/Votes/2022490
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-expected-ask-congress-avert-rail-strike-source-2022-11-28/
https://www.bnsf.com/about-bnsf/financial-information/pdf/performance-update-4q-2021.pdf
https://www.progressiverailroading.com/bnsf_railway/news/BNSF-posts-record-earnings-for-2021--66004
https://railroads.dot.gov/sites/fra.dot.gov/files/fra_net/1647/Railway%20Labor%20Act%20Overview.pdf
https://www.freightwaves.com/news/2-unions-split-votes-on-rail-labor-agreement
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/biden-expected-ask-congress-avert-rail-strike-source-2022-11-28/
https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/30/politics/congress-rail-vote-house/index.html
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2022/12/03/rail-workers-paid-sick-leave/
https://www.cnn.com/2022/12/02/business/railway-labor-act-freight-railroad-strike/index.html
https://www.cnn.com/2022/11/28/business/rail-strike-business-groups/index.html
https://www.railwayage.com/freight/class-i/up-fritz-2021-most-profitable-year-ever/
Jane
Addams, Twenty
Years at Hull-House (1910; rpt. Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1990), pp. 217-218.
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