"...The US president’s remarks [on Wednesday November 29]
were followed by UN ambassador Nikki Haley saying the ballistic missile launch
'brings us closer to war' at an emergency UN security council meeting, which
would end the North Korean regime.
"Trump said in a tweet he
had spoken with Chinese leader Xi Jinping about 'the provocative actions of
North Korea,' and promised: 'Additional major sanctions will be imposed on
North Korea today. This situation will be handled!'
"In remarks later on Wednesday at a public event in Missouri, Trump departed from a
speech about tax cuts to aim a barb at the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, who
he has previously referred to as 'Little Rocket Man.' 'Little Rocket Man, he is
a sick puppy,' the president said.
"Later Wednesday, at the UN, Haley said if war comes as a
result of further acts of 'aggression' like the latest launch 'make no mistake
the North Korean regime will be utterly destroyed'..." (The
Guardian).
“…JUST WAR THEORY
offers a series of principles that aim to retain a plausible moral framework
for war.
From the just war (justum bellum) tradition, theorists distinguish
between the rules that govern the justice of war (jus ad bellum) from
those that govern just and fair conduct in war (jus In bello) and the
responsibility and accountability of warring parties after the war (jus post
bellum). The three aspects are by no means mutually exclusive, but they
offer a set of moral guidelines for waging war that are neither unrestricted
nor too restrictive. The problem for ethics involves expounding the guidelines
in particular wars or situations.
“The principles of
the justice of war are commonly held to be: [1.]
Having just cause, [2.] Being a last
resort, [3.] Being declared by a proper authority, [4.] Possessing right
intention, [5.] Having a reasonable chance of success, and [6.] The end being
proportional to the means used.
“One can immediately
detect that the principles are not wholly intrinsicist nor
consequentialist—they invoke the concerns of both models. Whilst this provides
just war theory with the advantage of flexibility, the lack of a strict ethical
framework means that the principles themselves are open to broad interpretations.
Examining each in turn draws attention to the relevant problems.
“Possessing just
cause is the first and arguably the most important condition of jus ad
bellum.
Most theorists hold that initiating acts of aggression is unjust and gives a
group a just cause to defend itself. But unless ‘aggression’ is defined, this
proscription is rather open-ended. For example, just cause resulting from an
act of aggression can ostensibly be a response to a physical injury (for
example, a violation of territory), an insult (an aggression against national
honor), a trade embargo (an aggression against economic activity), or even to a
neighbor’s prosperity (a violation of social justice).
“The
onus is then on the just war theorist to provide a consistent and sound account
of what is meant by just cause. Whilst not going into the reasons why the other
explanations do not offer a useful condition of just cause, the consensus is
that an initiation of physical force is wrong and may justly be resisted.
Self-defense against physical aggression, therefore, is putatively the only
sufficient reason for just cause. Nonetheless, the principle of self-defense
can be extrapolated to anticipate probable acts of aggression, as well as in
assisting others against an oppressive government or from another external
threat (interventionism). Therefore, it is commonly held that aggressive war is
only permissible if its purpose is to retaliate against a wrong already
committed (for example, to pursue and punish an aggressor), or to pre-empt an
anticipated attack.
“In
recent years, the argument for preemption has gained supporters in the West:
surely, the argument goes, it is right on consequentialist grounds to strike
the first blow if a future war is to be avoided. By acting decisively against a
probable aggressor, a powerful message is sent that a nation will defend itself
with armed force; thus preemption may provide a deterrent and a more peaceful
world. However, critics complain that preemptive strikes are based on
conjectured rather than impending aggression and in effect denounce the moral
principle that an agent is presumed innocent – posturing and the building up of
armaments do not in themselves constitute aggression, just as a man carrying a
weapon is not a man using a weapon, Consequentialist critics may also reject
preemption on the grounds that it is more likely to destabilize peace, while
other realists may complain that a preemptive strike policy is the ploy of a
tyrannical or bullying power that justifies other nations to act in their
self-interest to neutralize either through alliances or military action – such
is the principle behind the ‘balance of power’ politics in which nations
constantly renew their alliances and treatises to ensure that not one of them
becomes a hegemonic power.
“It
is also feared that the policy of preemption slips easily into the machinations
of ‘false flag operations’ in which a pretext for war is created by a contrived
theatrical or actual stunt – of dressing one’s own soldiers up in the enemy’s
uniforms, for instance, and having them attack a military or even civilian
target so as to gain political backing for a war. Unfortunately, false flag
operations tend to be quite common. Just war theory would reject them as it
would reject waging war to defend a leader’s ‘honor’ following an insult.
Realists may defend them on grounds of a higher necessity but such moves are
likely to fail as being smoke screens for political rather than moral
interests.
“War should always be
a last resort.
This connects intimately with presenting a just cause – all other forms of
solution must have been attempted prior to the declaration of war. It has often
been recognized that war unleashes forces and powers that soon get beyond the
grips of the leaders and generals to control – there is too much ‘fog’ in war,
as Clausewitz noted, but that fog is also a moral haze in which truth and trust
are early casualties. The resulting damage that war wrecks tends to be very
high for most economies and so theorists have advised that war should not be
lightly accepted: once unleashed, war is not like a sport that can be quickly
stopped at the blow of a whistle (although the Celtic druids supposedly had the
power to stop a battle by virtue of their moral standing) and its repercussions
last for generations. Holding ‘hawks’ at bay though is a complicated task – the
apparent ease by which war may resolve disputes, especially in the eyes of
those whose military might is apparently great and victory a certainty, does
present war as a low cost option relative to continuing political problems and
economic or moral hardship. Yet the just war theorist wishes to underline the
need to attempt all other solutions but also to tie the justice of the war to
the other principles of jus ad bellum too.
“The notion of proper
authority
seems to be resolved for most of the
theorists, who claim it obviously resides in the sovereign power of the state.
But the concept of sovereignty raises a plethora of issues to consider here. If
a government is just, i.e., most theorists would accept that the government is
accountable and does not rule arbitrarily, then giving the officers of the
state the right to declare war is reasonable, so the more removed from a proper
and just form a government is, the more reasonable it is that its claim to
justifiable political sovereignty disintegrates.
“A
historical example can elucidate the problem: when Nazi Germany invaded France
in 1940 it set up the Vichy puppet regime. What allegiance did the people of
France under its rule owe to its precepts and rules? A Hobbesian rendition of
almost absolute allegiance to the state entails that resistance is wrong (so
long as the state is not tyrannical and imposes war when it should be
the guardian of peace); whereas a Lockean or instrumentalist conception of the
state entails that a poorly accountable, inept, or corrupt regime possesses no
sovereignty, and the right of declaring war (to defend themselves against the
government or from a foreign power) is wholly justifiable. The notion of proper
authority therefore requires thinking about what is meant by sovereignty, what
is meant by the state, and what is the proper relationship between a people and
its government.
“The possession of
right intention
is ostensibly less problematic. The
general thrust of the concept being that a nation waging a just war should be
doing so for the cause of justice and not for reasons of self-interest or
aggrandizement. Putatively, a just war cannot be considered to be just if
reasons of national interest are paramount or overwhelm the pretext of fighting
aggression. However, ‘right intention’ masks many philosophical problems.
According to Kant, possessing good intent constitutes the only condition of
moral activity, regardless of the consequences envisioned or caused, and
regardless, or even in spite, of any self interest in the action the agent may
have. The extreme intrinsicism of Kant can be criticized on various grounds,
the most pertinent here being the value of self-interest itself.
“At
what point does right intention separate itself from self-interest – is the
moral worthiness of intent only gained by acting in favor of one’s neighbor,
and if so, what does that imply for moral action – that one should woo one’s
neighbor’s spouse to make him/her feel good? Acting with proper intent requires
us to think about what is proper and it is not certain that not acting in
self-interest is necessarily the proper thing to do.
“On
the one hand, if the only method to secure a general peace (something usually
held to be good in itself) is to annex a belligerent neighbor's territory,
political aggrandizement becomes intimately connected with the proper intention
of maintaining the peace for all or the majority. On the other hand, a nation
may possess just cause to defend an oppressed group, and may rightly argue that
the proper intention is to secure their freedom, yet such a war may justly be
deemed too expensive or too difficult to wage; i.e., it is not ultimately in
their self-interest to fight the just war. On that account, the realist may
counter that national interest is paramount: only if waging war on behalf of
freedom is also complemented by the securing of economic or other military
interests should a nation commit its troops. The issue of intention raises the concern
of practicalities as well as consequences, both of which should be considered
before declaring war.
“The next principle
is that of reasonable success. This is another necessary condition
for waging just war, but again is insufficient by itself. Given just cause and
right intention, the just war theory asserts that there must be a reasonable
probability of success. The principle of reasonable success is consequentialist
in that the costs and benefits of a campaign must be calculated. However, the
concept of weighing benefits poses moral as well as practical problems as evinced
in the following questions:
“Should
one not go to the aid of a people or declare war if there is no conceivable
chance of success? Is it right to comply with aggression because the costs of
not complying are too prohibitive? Would it be right to crush a weak enemy
because it would be marginally costless? Is it not sometimes morally necessary
to stand up to a bullying larger force, as the Finns did when Russia invaded in
1940, for the sake of national self-esteem or simple interests of defending
land?
“Historically,
many nations have overcome the probability of defeat: the fight may seem
hopeless, but a charismatic leader or rousing speech can sometimes be enough to
stir a people into fighting with all their will. Winston Churchill offered the
British nation some of the finest of war's rhetoric when it was threatened with
defeat and invasion by Nazi Germany in 1940. For example: ‘Let us therefore
brace ourselves to do our duty, and so bear ourselves that, if the British
Commonwealth and its Empire lasts for a thousand years, men will still say,
'This was their finest hour.’….And ‘What is our aim? Victory, victory at all
costs, victory in spite of all terror; victory, however long and hard the road
may be; for without victory, there is no survival.’ (Speeches to Parliament,
1940). However, the thrust of the reasonable success principle emphasizes that
human life and economic resources should not be wasted in what would obviously
be an uneven match. For a nation threatened by invasion, other forms of
retaliation or defense may be available, such as civil disobedience, or even
forming alliances with other small nations to equalize the odds.
“The final guide of jus
ad bellum is that the desired end should be proportional to the means used. This principle
overlaps into the moral guidelines of how a war should be fought, namely the
principles of jus In bello. With regards to just cause, a policy of war
requires a goal, and that goal must be proportional to the other principles of
just cause. Whilst this commonly entails the minimizing of war's destruction,
it can also invoke general balance of power considerations.
“For
example, if nation A invades a land belonging to the people of nation B, then B
has just cause to take the land back. According to the principle of
proportionality, B’s counter-attack must not invoke a disproportionate
response: it should aim to retrieve its land and not exact further retribution
or invade the aggressor’s lands, or in graphic terms it should not retaliate
with overwhelming force or nuclear weaponry to resolve a small border dispute.
That goal may be tempered with attaining assurances that no further invasion
will take place, but for B to invade and annex regions of A is nominally a
disproportionate response, unless (controversially) that is the only method for
securing guarantees of no future reprisals. For B to invade and annex A, and
then to continue to invade neutral neighboring nations on the grounds that their
territory would provide a useful defense against other threats and a putative
imbalance of power is even more unsustainable.
“On
the whole, the principles offered by jus ad bellum are useful guidelines
for reviewing the morality of going to war that are not tied to the
intrinsicist’s absolutism or consequentialist’s open-endedness.
Philosophically, however, they invoke a plethora of problems by either their
independent vagueness or by mutually inconsistent results – a properly declared
war may involve improper intention or disproportionate ambitions. But war is a
complicated issue and the principles are nonetheless a useful starting point
for ethical examination and they remain a guide for both statesmen and women
and for those who judge political proceedings…”
